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The sharing of information across government intra- and inter-agencies provides enormous
benefits to Intelligence operations, but it also poses risks to Intelligence organizations’
operational capability. These benefits and risks of sharing information within Intelligence
Communities introduce a paradox that disturbs decision-making abilities and affect existing and
future relationships with local and national Intelligence partners. With this paradox, there exist
particular forces that affect the paradox, such as organizational factors and the behavior of an
information sharer, the responsible actor that decides on how, when and with whom to share the
information. Combining the two can produce a positive (desired) outcome that leads to
successful mission accomplishment or negative (inadvertent) outcome that leads to loss of
information disclosed or intentional loss of valuable information. An inadvertent outcome could
result in an impact to the national defense of the United States. Do Intelligence Analysts share
information when the risks outweigh the benefits? This research examines how understanding
the paradox of information sharing is a critical element in understanding the behavior of
Intelligence Analysts’ decision-making in Intelligence operations.
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ABSTRACT
The sharing of information across government intra- and inter-agencies provides enormous
benefits to Intelligence operations, but it also poses risks to Intelligence organizations’
operational capability. These benefits and risks of sharing information within Intelligence
Communities introduce a paradox that disturbs decision-making abilities and affect existing and
future relationships with local and national Intelligence partners. With this paradox, there exist
particular forces that affect the paradox, such as organizational factors and the behavior of an
information sharer, the responsible actor that decides on how, when and with whom to share the
information. Combining the two can produce a positive (desired) outcome that leads to
successful mission accomplishment or negative (inadvertent) outcome that leads to loss of
information disclosed or intentional loss of valuable information. An inadvertent outcome could
result in an impact to the national defense of the United States. Do Intelligence Analysts share
information when the risks outweigh the benefits? This research examines how understanding
the paradox of information sharing is a critical element in understanding the behavior of
Intelligence Analysts’ decision-making in Intelligence operations.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Domain
This research study investigates the paradox of information (info) sharing. First, there
are two important definitions regarding info sharing: non-electronic and electronic info sharing.
Javernpaa and Staples (2000) define non-electronic info sharing as the volitional conveyance of
information generated or obtained by one entity to another entity, whereas electronic info sharing
occurs via computing and communication technologies. In addition, there are competing
definitions and different ways to understand government info sharing and integration. Ramon
Gil-Garcia, Soon Ae, and Janssen (2009) define information integration as “the forming of a
large unit of organization entities, temporary or permanent, for the purpose of merging processes
or sharing information” (p. 2). Within the literature, there are definitions that highlight the
social and political nature, while other definitions focus more attention on info sharing and
integration from technical aspects. Davenport and Prusak (1997), Pardo, Cresswell, Thompson,
and Zhang (2006), Richardson and Asthana (2006), and Benjamin, Rockart, Morton, and Wyman
(1984) suggest that research that highlights the social aspects of government integration focuses
on info sharing, inter-agency collaboration, and coordination mechanisms. In contrast, research
that deals with the technical aspects focuses on topics such as interoperability and the integration
of data by means of various technologies, including standards-based document sharing,
middleware applications, data warehouses, and consolidated information systems (Dawes, 1996;
Larence, 2008; Lips, O'Neill, & Eppel, 2011; Luo, Zhang, & Leung, 2001; Miranda, 2003). The
focus of this research study is towards the social aspects of government integration focusing on
info sharing, inter-agency and intra-agency collaboration, coordination mechanisms, and the
behavior of information technology users. An example of Gil-Garcia et al.’s (2009) definition of
1
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integration and info sharing is the 2004 U.S. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
(IRTPA). The IRTPA authorized the president to create an Info Sharing Environment (ISE) for
the sharing of terrorism information in a manner consistent with national security and with
applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties. The plan of the ISE highlights
sharing of terrorism prevention-related information among all ISE participants, in the forms of
federal-to-state, state-to-state, state-to-locality, government-to-industry, and even federal
government-to-foreign ally.
Next, since this research investigates the paradox of info sharing, it is important to
understand and explain the meaning of paradox. Leaders in inter- and intra-agency
organizations, including the military, are given responsibilities to increase efficiency, reduce
budgets, foster innovation, and build teams for creativity, and are expected to think globally and,
at the same time, to think locally. It has become common to suggest these types of everyday
responsibilities are paradoxical in nature and it has become a cliché to managers and leaders.
Handy (1994) argues that paradox is both overused and underspecified; thus, simply labeling
something as a paradox does not necessarily advance the understanding of it. On the other hand,
other researchers often avoid defining paradox altogether (e.g., Westenholz (1993), which does
not advance the comprehension of paradox either. Although the term paradox provokes
numerous and various meanings, Hampden-Turner (1981) and Schneider (1990) suggest that it
begins with philosophers from the ancient Greeks to Existentialists who have viewed human
existence as paradoxical with the understanding of its position in tensions between life and death,
good and evil, self and other. Equally, psychologists have long stressed the cognitive nature of
paradox, examining its impacts of tensions on creativity and mental health or using paradoxical
therapy to help actors face their inner conflicts (Bateson, 1972; Harris, 1996; Rothenberg, 1979;
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Wartzawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974). In organizational studies, researchers have defined
paradox as contradictions embedded within a statement, human emotions, or organizational
practices (Eisenhardt & Westcott, 1988; Murnighan & Conlon, 1991; Vince & Broussine, 1996).
Conversely, others describe paradox as an observation that counters common beliefs or as an
unintended consequence (Davis, Maranville, & Oblog, 1997; Sitkin & Bies, 1993). The
approach of this research study is from the perspective of Koot, Sabelis, and Ybema (1996),
which argues for using the notion of one of the great philosophers, Ludwig Wittgenstein, which
suggests paradox as something surprising. In addition, the most useful definition is from Quinn
and Cameron (1988), authors of one of the leading books in the field of paradoxes; to wit,
“embracing clashing ideas, paradox . . . involves contradictory, mutually exclusive elements that
are present and operate equally at the same time.” They argued the importance of understanding
the complexity, diversity, and ambiguity of organizational life and highlighted the insightfulness
paradox offers the potentially powerful framework for examining the impacts of plurality and
change, adding understanding of divergent perspectives and disruptive experiences. Therefore,
the paradoxical view of this research is from Quinn and Cameron (1988) definition combined
with Ford and Backoff (1988) perspective, which defines paradox as some thing that denotes a
wide variety of contradictory, yet interwoven elements; i.e., perspectives, feelings, messages,
demands, identities, interests, or practices. The paradox construct is between the benefits and
risks in sharing information which is influence by two organizational factors: security policies
and info sharing policies and Intelligence Analysts’ (IA) behaviors: attitude and intuition, as
actors attempting to make sense of an increasingly intricate, ambiguous, and ever-changing IT
world. The paradox becomes apparent through the self or social reflection or interaction that
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reveals the seemingly absurd and irrational coexistence of the actual benefits and inherent risks
to info sharing.
In adopting the social aspect of info sharing, this research focuses on Information
Technology (IT) users of electronic info sharing that occurs via computing and communication
technologies. These particular IT users are both IA who have access to electronic information
and decision-makers when using communication technologies and deciding to share information.
Every day this unique group of IT users confronts the paradox: a mystery or consummate blend
of opposites on the systems they use to communicate with one another. This paradox becomes
apparent in the info sharing decision based on the IA knowledge of the organization’s security
and info sharing policies and the conflict that exists within them because of their personal
behavior, attitude and intuition, and their subjective normative beliefs. They must internally
analyze the benefit versus risk tradeoff propositions, which are impacted by the organization’s
security and info sharing policies and the individual’s beliefs, typically influenced by an actor’s
background factors that influence his/her behavior intention. One key factor to understand
within the paradox of info sharing in the organization is the inherent risk taker, not the
individual. The organization position would always assume the optimum cost-benefit analysis,
but the decision-maker, the IA, does not necessarily have all the information and can’t possible
consider all the variables in a cost-benefit analysis, which may very well conflict with the
organization’s security and info sharing policies. Would the government consciously hire risky
IA to share Intelligence data? We know that technology systems drive policy every bit as much
as policy drives technology systems. Policy and technology face paradoxes specifically where
policymakers appear to be comfortable with paradoxical situations, and even reap value from its
existence, because paradox can provide decision-makers critical wiggle room (John, Boardman,
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& Sauser, 2008). On the other hand, technology developers prefer less ambiguity and more
clear-cut specifications. John et al. (2008), suggest that the IT users’ preference for
unambiguous languages, like mathematics, desire for encyclopedic knowledge of prioritized
requirements, and occasional reluctance to buck the engineering community’s “conventional
wisdom” limits the IT users’ problem-solving approaches. Thus, there is conflict in the IT users’
decision-making when sharing information from an organizational versus an individual behavior
perspective.
Finally, in the info sharing domain, it is clear that, for an info sharing entity to survive, it
must develop and maintain long-term relationships with the entities it decides to share with in the
relationship. To this end, for the Intelligence Community (IC) to survive, it also depends on vast
quantities of information to build rapport with each other that attracts the attention of national
partners. Info sharing among government agencies gained considerable attention in the
aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and mass shooting rampages,
such as the one involving Fort Hood gunman Nidal Hassan who killed 13 people on a U.S.
military post. Feldman-Stewart et al. (2007) argued that there was “near universal agreement”
that fighting terror would require deeper data exchanges than ever existed before between interand intra-agencies, including our military forces. The improvement of info sharing among
government agencies has become one of the highest priorities of decision-makers, and the lack of
info sharing has been identified as a major point of failure leading to and responding to these
horrific events (Akbulut-Bailey, 2011).
Today, many international and U.S. political leaders place great emphasis on the purpose
of national and foreign policies that should establish a systematic bias in favor of much more
info sharing. The ability to collect, analyze, and respond to user information is of growing
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importance (Awad & Krishnan, 2006). One of the objectives of the IC is to be an integrated
network of agencies that work together to protect our nation’s defense. To this end, the
Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) Number 501, addresses the mandates in the IRTPA of
2004 to strengthen the sharing, integration, and management of information within the IC, and
establishes policies for discovery, dissemination or retrieval of intelligence, and intelligencerelated information collected or analysis produced by the IC. The objective of ICD 501 is
threefold: 1) to foster an enduring culture of responsible sharing and collaboration with an
integrated IC; 2) to provide an improved capacity to warn of and disrupt risks to the U.S.
homeland, and U.S. persons and interests; and 3) to provide more accurate, timely, and insightful
analysis to inform decision-making by the president, senior military commanders, national
security advisers, and other executive branch officials. Sharing information across interagencies, like foreign national partners, or intra-agencies, like the IC, is usually presented by the
potential gains that government agencies could obtain from their participation in the inter- or
intra-agency information exchange initiative. Some examples are to detect national security
threats around the world, increasing government transparency and accountability; reducing costs
and duplication; a more efficient agency or governmental organization; and improved decisionmaking for government officials and public servants. According to (Dawes, 1996), government
info sharing offers a real opportunity to share databases and make sharper decisions based on
more information that is complete.
Although there are number of potential benefits to sharing information, there are perhaps
an equal number of challenges, barriers, and risks not to share information; thus, a paradox
exists. The reasons not to share information, as highlighted within the literature, begin with the
complex integration and flow along a contour of difficult tasks facing a myriad of political,
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organizational, legal, and technical challenges (Gil-Garcia et al. (2009); Gil-Garcia, ChengalurSmith, and Duchessi (2007); (Luna-Reyes & Gil-Garcia, 2003; Luna-Reyes, Gil-Garcia, & Cruz,
2007). This may include lack of political support, lack of financial resources, individual privacy,
confidentiality, and secrecy concerns; WikiLeaks’ and Live Leaks’ release of damaging
information inadvertently or intentionally; and poor technical skills. Given the benefits and
challenges, this research suggests a gap exists which ends with a challenge not addressed by
using the technologies and other processes that creates the current paradox. This research
conjectures that the info sharing decisions of highly skilled or smart info sharers would reflect
superior decisions on the information to share, while the decisions of relatively less skilled or
risky info sharers are more likely to be induced by behavioral biases. This inference is motivated
by recent research in behavioral economics (Frederick (2005); Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro
(2013); and Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010)), which finds that lower levels of
smartness are associated with more anomalous preferences and stronger emotional behavioral
biases. The studies show that smart individuals exhibit lower levels of risk aversion and greater
patience (Korniotis & Kumar, 2011).
Within the literature, the fact that information has value in terms of monetary
importance is well known, and there are several information models to measure it; however, one
of the non-financial values of information where the preconception is not necessarily
straightforward for information is the value of power (Ahituv & Carmi, 2007). According to
Ahituv and Carmi (2007), the relationship between information and power in inter- or intraagencies can pertain to many issues that senior officials are challenged with, such as knowledge
management and info sharing. Specifically, the implication of these issues that senior officials
face today, Ahituv and Carmi (2007) argue, on one hand, is a driver of change in the distribution
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of power within the agency due to a change in the information distribution. However, on the
other hand, the introduction of these issues is a process that involves interested parties
intentionally using their power, deriving partly from the information they have, to affect the
nature of the agency and to obtain more power by obtaining more information. To this end,
Ahituv and Carmi (2007) postulate that this effect exists because there is a positive connection
between information and power.
Moreover, there are strong political pressures on inter- and intra-agencies to engage in
info sharing; however, in practical application, how consistently this is done really depends on
our foreign partners’ discretion as well as our inter-agencies’ application of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) policies. There is plenty of guidance within the IC on
info sharing; in fact, each agency has its own policies and supplements to national policies on
whether information should be shared, and, if so, what information, to whom, and to some
extent, the information shared is decided on a case-by-case basis. Our national partners also have
their own info sharing policies on what information should be shared, most importantly, with
whom, and may also decide to share, based on their nation’s interest, on a case-by-case basis.
Another concern for the IC’s mission in national defense is sharing of information that may lead
to classified information being mistakenly shared, resulting in information leakage, intentionally
or unintentionally. Intentional information leakage may be the result of espionage. On the other
hand, unintentional informational leakage can occur from inferences. Inferences occur when
extrapolated classified information is from different sources of unclassified shared information.
Inferences exist because of the inherent engineering relationships between different pieces of
information and have a major impact on national defense. One inference that is occurring more
frequently today is espionage. Espionage occurs because of the power of information.
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1.2 Research Perspective
This study will use the adaptation of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) which is an
extension of Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Ajzen, 2011, 2012; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2005) to
inform this research in capturing the paradox in the info sharing decision of an IA analysis of the
risks and benefits influenced by the organization’s security and info sharing policies as well as
his/her attitude and intuition. Although IA navigate the paradox of the benefits and risks in
sharing information, the influences as mentioned, impacts the decision to share on not share
information. These influences result in factors that drive behavior intentions of IA. An
intriguing factor is that an IA’s attitude and intuition may conflict with the organization’s
security and info sharing policies. Adaptation of the TPB to inform this research allows
examination and further understanding of the process of IA behavior that deals with the relations
among beliefs (attitudes and intuitions) and the intentions of sharing decisions. Perceived
Behavioral Control (PBC) is added as a construct to TPB to solve the problem of explaining
behaviors in which the actor does not have full volitional control (Fen & Sabaruddin, 2008).
TPB, when applied to a wide range of behaviors in order to understand why individuals behave
in a certain way, is one of the best-supported social psychological theories with respect to
predicting human behavior (Sommer, 2011). According to (Smith, Manstead, Terry, & Louis,
2007), the central premise is that behavioral decisions are the result of a reasoned process in
which the behavior is influenced by attitudes, norms, and perceived behavior control. With roots
in a social psychological approach to behavior, TPB and TRA postulate that changing behavior
is a matter of changing the cognitive structure underlying the behavior in question. The theories
are a series of four hypotheses. The first hypothesis relates to behavior assumed primarily to be
a function of an individual’s intention to perform that behavior. The second hypothesis relates to
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the intention to perform the behavior as a function of the weighted combination of two factors; a
personal factor that is the attitude toward the behavior and a social factor that is the subjective
norm. Thus, in this hypothesis, the attitude toward the behavior is the feeling of favorableness
toward the behavior and the subjective norm suggests the perception that people of importance
think that the individual should or should not perform the behavior. The third hypothesis
suggests that underlying the attitude toward the behavior is an underlying cognitive structure of
behavioral beliefs that performing the behavior will lead to certain outcomes and the evaluation
of these outcomes. Finally, the last hypothesis suggests the subjective norm is an underlying
cognitive structure of normative beliefs that particular individuals or groups think that one
should or should not perform the behavior and the individual’s motivation to comply with each
of these significant others.
In using information for decision-making, the information processing perspective argues
that individuals make decision based on the amount of information available to them and the
effort they expend to arrive at their decisions. It is impossible to imagine that every IA will have
all information available on a topic or complete understanding of the organization’s behavior
when deciding to share information with a given entity. Some researchers (Bettman, 1979;
Bettman & Park, 1980) argue that individual decision-making strategies vary on a continuum
from being completely rational normative to purely heuristic. This suggests that, where all the
necessary information and resources are available, an individual makes a rational-normative
decision for arriving at an accurate optimal decision. Conversely, in the situations where the
context is novel and the information available is limited, individuals resort to heuristic decisionmaking style, through which they draw generalizations and projections to arrive at an appropriate
decision, which minimizes perceived cognitive burden and risk (Bettman & Park, 1980).
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Therefore, to understand an individual’s behavior in info sharing decision-making, and perhaps
to help the practitioners more successfully manage ways to identify, seek, assess, use and share
information, the research will endeavor to answer the question: How do IA navigate the paradox
between the benefits and risks affected by individual behaviors and organization factors that
inhibit info sharing decisions?
The adaptation of the TPB is used to inform this research study in analyzing an
individual’s behavior intention in making the decision to share information with others, either
within the government inter- or intra-agency organizations or publicly with other individuals.
However, the research study will also use an exploratory approach from a grounded theory
perspective. Charmaz (2010) argues this approach and method bring surprises, spark ideas, and
foster seeing data in fresh ways and exploring ideas about the data through early analytic writing.
It also offers flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing qualitative data to construct theories
grounded in the data themselves (Charmaz, 2010, p. 2). Thus, the data form the foundation of
the theory and the analysis of the data generates the concepts that are constructed. In this
approach, one attends to what he/she hears, sees, and senses during the interview. Using this
approach, this research will take a constructivist approach to the exploratory study. Charmaz
(2010) also argues a constructivist approach places priority on the phenomena of study and sees
both data and analysis as created from shared experiences and relationships with participants and
other sources of data. A critical element in the constructivist approach is that it studies the how
and sometimes the why participants may construct meaning and actions in specific situations.
Moreover, Charmaz (2010) argues constructivist grounded theorists take a reflexive stance
toward the research process and products and consider how their theories evolve, from which she
postulates that both researchers and research participants interpret meanings and actions. The
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justification for building a theory as opposed to only using existing theory, Bartunek, Rynes, and
Ireland (2006) argue for research that builds theory from cases are often regarded as the “most
interesting” research and are among the most highly cited pieces in the Academy of Management
Journal, with impact disproportionate to their numbers (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). With the
understanding that sound empirical research begins with strong grounding in related literature,
which identifies a research gap and proposes research questions that address the gap, theory
building from cases requires researchers to take an added step of justifying why theory building
rather than theory-testing better addresses the research question. The critical point to the
justification in building theory in this study is to convince readers that the research question is
crucial for organizations and/or theory, and demonstrate that the existing research either does not
address the research question at all, or does so in a way that is inadequate or likely to be untrue
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).

1.3 Research Approach
Using an exploratory approach from a grounded theory perspective and employing the
constructivist grounded theorist perspective allows for a set of principles and practices, not as
prescriptions or packages, but emphasizes flexible guidelines, according to Charmaz (2010).
Therefore, it is also important to understand additional approaches, methodological rules,
recipes, and requirements to dealing with the how and how questions in research studies. (Van
de Ven, 2007a) suggests there are two basic epistemologies that underlie the different approaches
that are necessary to study research questions dealing with what and how. Bruner (1986), p.
147), distinguished them as representing two basic types of human intelligence: the
paradigmatic, logical-scientific (variance) mode of thought and the narrative (process) mode of
thought. He describes them as follows:
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There are two modes of cognitive functioning, two modes of
thought, each providing distinctive ways of ordering experience, of
constructing reality.
The two (though complimentary) are
irreducible to one another…. Each of the ways of knowing,
moreover, has operating principles of its own and its own criteria of
well-formedness. They differ radically in their procedures for
verification. (Bruner, 1986: 11)
Bruner highlights that we have relatively little knowledge about how narrative understanding
works compared to the vast literature on paradigmatic thinking and its methods. Although recent
research in many fields is filling this void, much remains to be done. Aldrich (2001)
distinguishes the what and how questions in terms of outcome-driven and event-driven research,
as follows:
Outcome-driven explanations are built backward, from an awareness
of observed outcomes to prior casually significant events. Two
related problems are introduced with this strategy. First, it often
leads to investigators’ selecting on the dependent variable, a wellknown research bias. Second, even though we might include all
organizations—those that have experienced the event and those that
have not—we still observed them at only one point in time (Aldrich
2001: 118). Conversely, event driven explanations are built forward,
from observed or recorded events to outcomes. (Aldrich 2001: 118).
Aldrich (2001) notes that researchers often run into trouble by not making explicit
distinctions between event-driven and outcome-driven studies of organizational and other social
processes. His argument is based on two different definitions of process used within the
literature: 1) a category of concepts or variables that pertain to actions and 2) activities and a
narrative describing how things develop and change (Van de Ven, 1992). The research question
of this study is: How do IA navigate the paradox between the benefits and risks affected by
individual behaviors and organizations factors that inhibit info sharing decisions? While the
research question could fall in the category of the second definition, which typically takes an
event-driven approach that is often associated with a process study of the temporal sequence of
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events (Abbott, 1988; Pentland, 1999; Poole, 1983; Tsoukas, 2005), this study will use the first
definition, which is associated with a variance model with an outcome driven explanation.
According to Mohr (1982), when the first definition is used, process is typically associated with
a variance model where an outcome-driven explanation examines the degree to which a set of
independent variables statistically explain variations in some outcome criteria (dependent
variables).
Mohr (1982) and Poole (1983) distinguished variance and process approaches to social
scientific research. A variance model explains change in terms of relationships among
independent variables and dependent variables, while a process model explains how a sequence
of events leads to some outcome. The common thread running through both works is the
difference between scientific explanations cast in terms of independent variables causing
changes in a dependent variable, and explanations that tell a narrative or story about how a
sequence of events unfolds to produce a given outcome. In this particular study, the variance
method will seek to explain continuous change driven by deterministic causation, with
independent variables acting upon and causing changes in dependent variables.
The research will closely examine the paradox confronting the IA when sharing, more
specifically, the reasons the IA may be willing to share information with others, even when the
risks may outweigh the benefits. The researcher will also closely examine the behaviors of the
IA in their decision analysis of intelligence operational mission-based info sharing events.
Although the intelligence mission scenarios are theoretic, they are possible mission events that
will serve as the basis for examining a user’s behavior in deciding to share information. The
security and info sharing policies are independent variables as well as attitude and intuition. In
any military battle, the formidable force is often the entity that has the most complete and
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accurate information that is collected and shared among other reliable forces, but not the enemy.
However, although each entity may share information with trusted partners, each side faces
variations of information leakage, espionage, and political strife that affect the decision to share
information, and that makes the information valuable in terms of power or less valuable over
time in terms of diminishing return on investment. The researcher has selected to use
intelligence mission scenarios because they examine the actor’s decision and behavior intention.
How will he/she evaluate risk (consequences) versus benefits, consider the security and info
sharing policies, and will his/her personal or subjective norm be the controlling factors to the
sharing decision? These similarities and differences will allow the researcher to combine literal
and theoretical replication logic (Yin, 2009). While this will not ensure generalizability of the
study, it will hopefully add to the robustness and confidence in the findings (Yin, 2009). To
deepen the understanding and to help achieve satisfactory validity, the researcher will collect
data from several sources using different data collection methods, including formal interviews
with Intelligence community users, analysis of email correspondence, observations of recent
events, and review of archival documents.
To improve its relevance to practice, this study will utilize the pluralistic methodology of
engaged scholarship (Van de Ven, 2007b; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995) as a participative
approach involving the perspectives of various stakeholders in order to understand complex
problems (Van de Ven, 2007, p. 9). Although the researcher will remain in control and direct all
research activities, advice and feedback will be solicited from various key stakeholders and
informants, such as public users, information security managers, military IA and other
researchers, in each step of the research process, including research design, theory building,
problem solving, and problem formulation (Van de Ven, 2007 p. 26-29). The research will
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follow data analysis procedures and display methods suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994b)
for qualitative case studies using three concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data display,
and conclusion drawing and verification.
As a result, this research will make five valuable contributions: 1) describe the paradox
of the info sharing decision of an IA analysis of the benefits and risks influenced by the
organization’s security and info sharing policies and an individual’s behavior intention; 2)
explain the decision-making behavior of people’s willingness to share information with others,
even when the risks may outweigh the benefits (to better understand how we might go about
modifying behavior in a desirable direction); 3) demonstrate how TPB may be used as an
analytical framework that describes how past behavior of users decisions to share information
with others in the IC; 4) develop a conceptual framework to evaluate adherence to info sharing
decision-making in the IC; and 5) provide practical guidance for improving IA decision-making
in the presence of the paradox.

1.4 Summary
The subsequent chapters of this dissertation proposal detail the arguments underpinning
the research as follows:


Chapter 2 Literature Review: This chapter presents a comprehensive review of the
literature in the area of info sharing by examining what previous research reveals about
first, the benefits of info sharing and the widespread need for more to conduct military
intelligence operations; second, the power of information in the organizational
environment both as positive and negative forces; and last, information sharing policy
and political ramifications, as well as how info sharing results in information leakage and
espionage, each of which pose serious threats to our nation’s defense. In part, this
chapter focuses on existing knowledge concerning the benefits of info sharing and the
effects of info sharing because of the value in information or the power associated with
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owning the information. The review reveals that few qualitative variance studies exist
that explore the paradox in info sharing; specifically, the inconsistencies between the
IA’s behavioral intentions to share information and the organization’s security and info
sharing policies to actually release information that results in a positive or negative
outcome based on the value of the data alone or the value of information when
aggregated with other information.

Why would the IA decide to share certain

information with little regard for the risk in doing so and for little return (cost-benefit),
while the disclosure of that same data puts the organization at risk and, doing so, affects
national interest, meaning greater risk and a higher return?


Chapter 3 Theory of Planned Behavior: This chapter provides a description of the
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), its applications in prior case studies, and its
constructs of a person’s behavioral, normative and control beliefs. This review helps to
illustrate how TPB, with its central focus on the background factors that may influence
the beliefs people hold and how these factors are expected to influence intentions and
behavior indirectly by their effects on the IA’s decisions to share information.
Therefore, the researcher’s approach is to use the adaptation of the TPB to inform this
research study in analyzing the decisions of the IA’s info sharing decision-making risks
outcomes using intelligence operational mission-based events that are interesting because
of what they reveal about the common sense, everyday layman’s view of the world.



Chapter 4 Research Design: This chapter discusses the reasons for this study utilizing a
qualitative, exploratory approach to discover answers to questions through the application
of scientific procedures. The main aim is to answer a how or why question with the
researcher having little control over the contemporary events to be examined. Further,
this section explains the use of the engaged scholarship approach in an effort to increase
the research’s relevance and include the insightful perspectives of key stakeholders to
gain familiarity with a phenomenon and to achieve new insights into it. In addition, it has
to portray accurately the characteristics of a particular individual and situations. This
segment also discusses the critical realist philosophy that underlies the engaged
scholarship approach; a philosophy that adopts an objective ontology but a subjective
epistemology.
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Chapter 5 Data Analysis: This chapter outlines the data collection strategy that will
follow the three recommended principles of data collection for case studies in order to
deepen understanding and improve validity through data triangulation: (1) using multiple
sources of evidence; (2) creating a case study database; and (3) maintaining a chain of
evidence. It also details the methods used in analyzing this qualitative data consisting of
three concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing
and verification.



Chapter 6 Discussion:

This chapter discusses why people share information with

others; primarily, what influences the individual’s decision that drives him/her to violate
security and info sharing policies. The understanding of IA behaviors allows a better
understanding of how one might go about modifying behavior in a desirable direction.
The results provide support that background factors do influence the beliefs people hold.


Chapter 7 Contributions and Limitations: This chapter discusses the major
contributions revealing the paradox in info sharing: 1) describing the paradox of the info
sharing decision of an IA’s analysis of the benefits and risks influenced by the
organization’s security and info sharing policies and an individual’s behavior intention;
2) explaining the decision-making behavior of people’s willingness to share information
with others, even when the risks may outweigh the benefits, (to better understand how we
might go about modifying behavior in a desirable direction.); 3) demonstrating how TPB
may be used as an analytical framework that describes how past behavior of users
decisions to share information with others in the IC; 4) developing a conceptual
framework to evaluate adherence to info sharing decision-making in the IC; and 5)
providing practical guidance for improving IA decision-making in the presence of the
paradox.

LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Information
Information is a ubiquitous label whose meaning is almost never specified. According to
McKinney Jr and Yoos Ii (2010), virtually all the extant IS literature fails to explicitly specify
meaning for the very label that identifies information and, more important, that this is a vital
omission, because without defining what we are talking about, we can hardly know it.

Since IS

has nominated a plethora of attributes, such as relevant, accessible, timely, accurate, variable,
flexible, and complete to describe information, Newman (2001), argues that it is important to
produce what information means, its scope or the implication of the various definitions. Since
the pursuit of a more coherent understanding of information has become the subject of a new
domain, the philosophy of information, McKinney and Yoos Ii (2010) present a taxonomy of
information that secures the term.
From a token view, McKinney and Yoos Ii (2010)posit that information and data are both
tokens manipulated by processes. There is a widespread view in IS on this understanding,
particularly from Majchrzak, Rice, Malhotra, King, and B. (2000), who studied a virtual team’s
use of collaborative software. The software allowed team members to create, store, retrieve,
distribute, and analyze data, a process that manipulates tokens. In the syntax view, information is
the measureable relationship among tokens that reduces entropy. The tokens in this view are
mental states; the effectiveness measure of information quantifies the change in mental states. In
the representation view, information is meaning. Meaning emerges from a sign that stands for
an object to a particular observer. An example from IS research is the personal information
construct in privacy research. Personal information (sign) about an individual (object) gives
meaning to an unknown their parity (observer). Finally, in the adaptation view, subjectivity
19
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assumptions are introduced to explain how information is created by a system (e.g., person,
organization). Information is created when a system perceives differences in its environment,
which alters that system. Understanding the taxonomy of information is important to this
research study because, as posited by McKinney Jr and Yoos Ii (2010, p. 339), “it purports to
represent what information really is.” To understand this leads to the value of information and
its power in military operations and to Intelligence Operators who decide to share information.

2.2 Paradoxes
Quinn and Cameron (1988) define paradox, also referred to as antinomy, as a real or
apparent contradiction between equally well-based assumptions or conclusions. They argue that,
when considered separately, the arguments supporting paradoxical propositions appear sound;
however, considered together, the arguments appear contrary or even contradictory. Within the
literature, much effort has been devoted to resolving or understanding paradoxes, because they
reveal inconsistencies in our logic or assumptions (Quinn & Cameron, 1988). Paradoxes can
arise either from theoretical inconsistencies or from limited frames of reference. They often
require us to alter our assumptions, to shift perspectives, to pose problems in fundamentally
different ways, and to focus on different research questions. According to Quinn and Cameron
(1988), when studying paradoxes, we are forced to ask very different questions and to come up
with answers that stretch the boundaries of current theories. They postulate that the resulting
formulations are likely to be of interest not only to organizational scholars, but also to all
scholars of social process; therefore, addressing organizational paradoxes is both exciting and
challenging and inspires new ideas and creative theory.
Within the literature, contingency theory is an alternative approach that is used as a
response to tensions or conflict within organizational systems. Early contingency theory from
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the late 1960s inspired decades of research exploring how contexts influence the effectiveness of
opposing alternatives (Smith & Lewis, 2011). However, according to Smith and Lewis (2011),
the paradoxical studies approach to tensions and conflict involves exploring how organizations
can attend to competing demands simultaneously as opposed to contingency theory, which
explores conditions by selecting among competing demands. They argue that, although choosing
among competing tensions or conflict might aid short-term performance, a paradox perspective
argues that long-term sustainability requires continuous efforts to meet multiple, divergent
demands (Cameron, 1986; Lewis, 2000). Within the literature, Wendy K. Smith and Marianne
W. Lewis (2011) found, after surveying over the past 20 years across several different
management journals, not only have scholars increasingly adopted a paradox perspective, but
there also has been an increase in the research in studies of organizational phenomena and levels
of analysis. Their framework, built on four categories of paradox, represents core activities and
elements of organizations: learning, belonging, organizing, and performing. The most
interesting of the four are organizing and performance paradoxes. Smith and Lewis (2011)
suggest that organizing paradoxes surface as complex systems, which create competing designs
and process to achieve a desired outcome. These include tensions between collaborating and
competing (Murnighan and Conlon (1991), empowerment and direction (Denison, Hooijberg, &
Quinn, 1995), or routine and change (Flynn & Chatman, 2001; Gittell, 2004). Performing
paradoxes stem from the plurality of stakeholders and result in competing strategies and goals.
Tensions surface between the differing, and often conflicting, demands of varied internal and
external stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).
In summary, the literature highlights the richness and scope of a paradox perspective.
The key finding is that there are conflicting yet inter-related elements identified across a range of
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organizational phenomena as well across differing levels of analysis. The literature suggests
tensions and conflict at the level of the individual (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), dyad (Argyris,
1988), group (Smith & Berg, 1987), project (Van Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis, & Veenswijk, 2008),
and, most important, the organization (Cameron & Quinn, 1988). According to Cameron and
Quinn (1988), there are four strategic approaches that can be used to resolve paradoxes and that
each represent a different way of transforming research theories and ways of thinking. First,
even with accepting the paradox and learning to live with it, we learn that it has a cost to bear.
To accept a paradox is to acknowledge that things need not be consistent and that the seemingly
opposed viewpoints can inform one another and our models are just models, incapable of fully
capturing the conflict, no matter how strongly our logical arrogance tries to convince us
otherwise. All the other strategies suggest resolving the tension or conflict between the contrary
positions. Bertrand Russell’s (1970) approach, which is the most interesting, attempts to resolve
this by clarifying levels of reference and the connections among them. According to Cameron
and Quinn (1988), level distinctions, such as part-whole, micro-macro, or individual-society,
have proven extremely useful for social research, and to carry out this analysis, it is necessary to
specify as precisely as possible how the levels interrelate. Supporting this approach is Reese and
Overton's (1978) formulation where one side of the paradox may influence the conditions under
which the other will operate.

2.3 Info Sharing Paradox
As a starting point, the info sharing paradox in this research study refers to the conflict
between the benefits and risks confronted by the IA. This conflict is also influenced by the
organization’s security and info sharing polices as well as the attitude and intuition of the IA.
Often times the influences that drive an IA’s decision are also in conflict. The decision results in
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a positive or negative outcome based on benefits and risks. Why would the IA decide to share
certain information with little regard for the risk in doing so and for little return (cost-benefit),
while that same data disclosed puts the organization at risk and doing so affects national interest;
meaning greater risk and a higher return? Paradoxes are well-established concepts in many
fields of the social sciences, even though the precise contours and cases of the paradox are quite
controversial. There are opposing forces in the info sharing paradox between the benefits and
risks influenced by the organization’s security and info sharing policies as well as the IA’s
behavior all compete with one another and affect the outcome of the info sharing decision
exchange. Another conjecture of this research is the IA’s knowledge, smart info sharer, of the
organization’s info and sharing policies that facilitate sharing information appropriately with
others. However, while navigating the conflict of the benefits and risks, the IA’s knowledge,
risky info sharer, may be biased when influenced by an IA’s attitude and intuition. Some
decisions to share information may put the organization at higher risks because of IA behaviors,
which could result in little regard for benefits, whether the intentions are inadvertently or
intentionally.
The info sharing paradox, weighting the benefits versus the risks, is based on the superior
information advantage that exists from the organization’s analysis that the IA has complete
understanding of all the variables and associated risks (cost-benefit analysis) to sharing the
information as well as his/her behavior. The organization’s approach of optimal sharing trends
is based on the principle that every IA completely believes in and understands the derived policy
on the different classifications of the information; inter- and intra-agency relationships; and
continuous internal meetings and agreements with national partners and the sharing of
information. The organization’s principle is based on the belief that information advantage will

24
alleviate the information asymmetry between the IA and the organization’s assessment (costbenefit analysis) of the risk and other organizational characteristics that will result in a more
accurate risk decision to the sharing of information.
In the IS literature, there is a considerable body of academic research on the privacy
paradox, similar to the info sharing paradox, which is premised on the assumption of rational
choice (John, Acquisti, & Loewenstein, 2011). The work has been characterized by the
following assumptions: 1) people make sensible and consistent trade-offs between privacy and
other concerns (Derlega, Metts, Petronio, & Margulis, 1993; Petronio, 2000; Posner, 1981;
Rosenfeld, 2000) and 2) there are reliable differences between individuals in concern for privacy
(Laudon, 1996). This holds true for the info sharing paradox as well. An IA’s decision to share
information is based on the assumption of a rational choice with sensible trade-offs between the
benefits and risks associated with sharing information. The argument is based on the consistency
and the reliable difference between the IA’s behavior (attitude and intuition) and the
organization’s security and info sharing policies when considering the benefits and risks tradeoffs. It has been argued that disclosure decisions are made by balancing “the usefulness of
privacy with the utility of openness” (Petronio, 2000, p. 37) and that people engage in
“disclosure management,” such that they disclose information only when they expect a “net
benefit” (White, 2004, p. 48).
The similarities in the privacy and info sharing paradox are based on the trade-offs of the
benefits and risks in disclosure of information. In the privacy paradox, active and willing
participants are seen as individuals in the market for personal information and viewed as
consumers or rational economic agents who are either fully informed or who based their
decisions on probabilities coming from known random distributions. In the info sharing
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paradox, these active and willing participants are the IA who are the individuals in the market
for privilege information (secrecy or aggregated) and are certainly viewed as the rational
economic agents in the IC. As in the privacy paradox, an important factor in the info sharing
paradox is that the IA are agents who are either fully informed or who based their decisions on
probabilities also coming from known random distributions. In the privacy paradox, consumers
not only have the right to manage the privacy trade-offs without regulative intervention, they
also can use that right in their own best interest. Unlike the privacy paradox, in the info sharing
paradox, the IA must manage the benefits and risks of sharing info with regulative intervention;
however, like the privacy paradox, they often may use their right in their own best interest.
According to Canada (2012), the reason this exists in the privacy paradox is individuals concern
about privacy is not absolute. The argument is the same for the info sharing paradox; info
sharing is not absolute. He further explains that consumers are willing to knowingly trade off
privacy concerns for economic benefits. He argues that, in some cases, private information is
consciously exchanged for convenience, personalization, or merely the ability to use a website.
How does this relate to the info sharing paradox? The argument in the privacy paradox is the
very same in the info sharing paradox. Is there appropriate value or return on investment in the
trade-off, for the disclosure or share of information? Therefore, theorists argue that what must
be considered is the deviation between attitudes about sharing info and the actual behavior in the
handling of sharing the info.
Weighing the risks and benefits in the privacy paradox are the same in the info sharing
paradox. Often the IA does not have all the information for complete assessment of the risks and
benefits when sharing info and consumers are faced with the same challenge. For example, in an
online transaction, a consumer may possess incomplete information when considering the risks
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and benefits in sharing info. The consumer is not fully aware of the nature and existence of
privacy invasion. In other words, data collection by third parties may be taking place without the
knowledge of the consumer. In considering the risks and benefits to sharing the privacy
information, the consumer lacks complete information regarding the alternative or the ease of not
only protective technologies, but also understanding how the disclosed information will be used
by the collecting agent or the third party. Canada (2012) argues that most people do find it
difficult enough just to find and understand a company’s privacy policy, much less to monitor
the company’s use of personal information and detect when violations have occurred. In info
sharing, the IA constantly navigates the paradox of the benefits and risks that are influenced by
the organization’s security and info sharing policies. This is relevant to the IA’s decision of
sharing info based on the concept of bounded rationality. The concept bounded rationality refers
to our inability to acquire, memorize, and process information that is relevant to the decisionmaking process and applies to both the info sharing and privacy paradoxes. Specifically in the
privacy context, John, Acquisti, and Loewenstien (2011) define bounded rationality as the
inability to calculate and compare the magnitudes of the payoffs associated with various
strategies the individuals may choose in privacy situations. He also suggest that it refers to the
inability to process all the stochastic, meaning non-determinative, information related to risks
and probabilities of events leading to privacy costs and benefits. Theorist arguments suggest
even the most privacy-concerned individuals are not informed and cannot inform themselves
about privacy risks, even when that information is available because they simple cannot process
that amount of information. Therefore, individuals resort to simplified mental models,
approximate strategies, and heuristics, such as intuition, an educated guess, or common sense.
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2.4 Government Inter- and Intra-Agency Info Sharing
Akbulut-Bailey (2011) postulates that, “the improvement of information sharing among
government agencies has become one of the highest priorities of decision makers as the lack of
information sharing has been identified as a major point of failure leading to and responding to
these horrific events” (p.53). From a historical perspective, Boudreau and Robey (2005)
postulated that the need for info sharing was from the public administration reform in the 20th
century based on the conviction that, “only through efficient government could progressive
social welfare be achieved” (p. 3). Thus, government info sharing acquired its necessity from
the goal of public service where the lens of efficiency was the pillar to democracy (mixed
metaphor) (Wenjing, 2011).
From an inter- and intra-agency perspective, scholars from different theoretical traditions
propose that, in order to realize the most important benefits from the use of information and the
info sharing technologies, agencies should integrate their information across organizational
boundaries (Caffrey, 1998; Dawes, 1996; Gil-Garcia et al., 2007; Ramon Gil-Garcia et al., 2009;
Javernpaa & Staples, 2000; Pardo et al., 2006; Richardson & Asthana, 2006). Navarrete (2009)
argues the national boundaries are changing and governments from different countries are
collaborating and sharing information in order to face complex public problems, such as
environmental degradation, terrorism, public health, national security, and economic crises.
Within the literature, as suggested by Akbulut-Bailey (2011), there is very limited academic
research on info sharing among government agencies. Chong, Lin, Ooi, and Raman (2009)
conducted the first major study on inter-agency info sharing. Their study focused on the benefits
and risks of info sharing among state agencies. Conversely, Dawes (1996) conducted research
on inter-agency info sharing as it relates to the expected benefits and manageable risks. Each of
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them categorized the benefits and risks into three areas as they related to state or inter-agency
info sharing.
However, previous research has given minimal consideration to a fourth area of the
behavior of users who share information while navigating in the risks and benefits as it relates to
sharing information, specifically the reasons users are willing to share information with others,
even when the risks may outweigh the benefits. Table 1 includes a fourth area that is considered
in this research study and extends the areas considered by both Dawes (1996) and Chong et al.
(2009).
Table 1: Categories of Benefits, Risks, and Barriers (Dawes, 1996)

Category

Benefits

Barriers/Risks

Technical




Streamlines data management
Contributes to information
infrastructure






Incompatible technologies
Inconsistent data structures
Poor technical skills
WikiLeaks/Live Leak of
damaging information,
inadvertently or intentionally

Organizational




Supports problem-solving
Expands professional networks




Organizational self-interest
Domain professional
frameworks

Political





Supports domain-level action
Improves public accountability
Fosters program and service
coordination



External influences over
decision-making
Power of agency discretion
Primacy of programs






Tacit Knowledge
Superior Info Advantage
Absorptive Capability
Intelligence Analysis





Individual
Behavior







Media Exposure
Attitudes
Values, Emotions, and
Intuition
Individual Interests
Age, Gender, Race,
Ethnicity, and Religion
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Is there a limit to the amount of information that a user has when considering to share? Are there
certain types of information too damaging to share? Are there specific situations where the
information shared is more detrimental to the agency that outweighs the benefit to share?
Clearly, from this view, the answer to these questions is fundamentally “yes.” However, a
paradox exists with the benefits of info sharing. There are an equal number of challenges,
barriers, and risks not to share information. Both have an impact on determining the power of
the information and the sharer’s decision to share the information during a time of war or crisis.
This research does not suggest that information sharing should be avoided, nor does it imply that
every scenario will lead to negative outcomes. This research offers another perspective: that
information behavior that socially and culturally constitutes ways to identify, seek, assess, use,
and share information changes and develops with the user’s behavior and knowledge of the risks
and benefits to sharing info. The main idea is that, if the user is someone knowledgeable about
the risks versus the benefits, this may reflect a superior decision. While if someone who is less
knowledgeable about the risks versus the benefits, his/her decision to share information may be
induced by behavioral biases. Since this issue has been given minimal attention in the info
sharing literature, the current research provides needed insight in this area.
With intra-agencies’ info sharing, there is a trend to encourage groups to share information
and knowledge (Zhang, Zeng, Wang, Li, & Geng, 2011; Zhang, Dawes, & Sarkis, 2005).
Conversely, Wheatley (2006) highlights that, in the bureaucratic model, information flows within
agencies are strictly controlled; the point being, with limited access to the sharing of information
and knowledge, members lack the capability to develop integrated solutions to problems. In
addition, members within the agencies often do not share information scattered among intraagency communities (Ardichvill, Page, & Wentling, 2005; Cress & Kimmerle, 2006). Within
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the literature, many factors can influence inter-/intra-agency info sharing. According to Yang
and Maxwell (2011), the relationships between these factors are complex and each factor can
influence the other.
In inter-agency info sharing, Landsbergen and Wolken (2001) state that interoperability
across agencies represents cross-boundary info sharing. Within the literature, researchers have
recognized the importance of cross-boundary info sharing, especially in the area of e-government
research (Cresswell, Pardo, Canestrato, Dawes, & Juraga, 2005; Pardo et al., 2006; Pardo &
Tayi, 2007; Schooley & Horan, 2007). Specifically, Pardo et al. (2006) state that leaders and IT
executives in the public sector have increasingly recognized the importance of inter-agency info
sharing to improve the efficiency of government agencies. However, info sharing and
knowledge management can involve complex interactions between participating government
agencies. Dawes' (1996) research in inter-agency info sharing and Zhang' et al. (2005) research
in e-government knowledge sharing both define and view influential factors from the three
primary perspectives of technology, management, and policy. The focus of this research study,
however, is on the inter- and intra-agency info sharing from a user’s change in behavior
perspective and his/her decision to share based on the value or power of this information.
In summary, (Yang & Maxwell, 2011) postulate that, during the last 15 years, public and
government organizations have shifted from a model that emphasized only information
protection to one where cross-organization info sharing is the new goal. This is primarily due to
events such as 9/11, policy changes that emphasized cross-government coordination to improve
efficiency and reduce waste, and changes in technology that allowed organizations to exchange
information based on standard transmission and information exchange protocols (Yang &
Maxwell, 2011). Scholars from different theoretical traditions propose that, in order to realize
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the benefits from the use of information and the info sharing technologies, agencies should
integrate their information across organizational and national boundaries (Caffrey, 1998;
Cresswell et al., 2005; Dawes, 1996; Gil-Garcia et al., 2007; Navarrete, 2009). In addition, there
are a number of factors that influence info sharing across inter- and intra-agency boundaries, and
the relationships among these factors influence info sharing. Finally, it is important to realize
governments from different countries are collaborating and sharing information in order to face
complex public problems in their environment.
Therefore, there are complex and paradoxical effects to the Intelligence and business
leaders’ decision-making with this shift to sharing of more information. Conversely, recent
events, such as Edward J. Snowden, an American computer specialist who worked for the CIA
and NSA and supposedly leaked details of several top-secret U.S. and British government mass
surveillance programs to the press, suggest there should be greater emphasis on information
protection. Today, the insider threat underscores the complex nature of sharing of information
and the decision-maker’s dilemma in determining the organizations’ risks versus the greater
good to info sharing. Within the literature an emphasis is placed on the need for more inter/intra-agency info sharing and to interoperability between diverse information systems. (GilGarcia et al., 2009; JinKyu, Nitesh, Jing, Marijn, & Rao, 2010) suggested that, after the U.S.
terrorist attacks and world natural disasters, our fragmented nature of policy-making and service
provisioning revealed the need for more inter- and intra-agency information sharing.

2.5 Inter- and Intra-Agency Info Sharing Benefits, Risk and Barriers
Although the benefits realized from info sharing differ from organization to organization
or agency to agency, Dawes (1996) classified them into three categories: technical,
organizational, and political. He posits that technical benefits refer to potential positive results.
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They relate to the processing and managing of information, such as reduced duplication of data
collection, processing, and storage, as well as the creation of formal standards or shared technical
infrastructure. The organizational benefit refers to positive results for the organization as a
whole that includes better coordination, improved decision-making processes, and reduced costs;
and the political benefit refers to the impact on the political image and policy goals of the
organization leading the info sharing and integration effort.
Important benefits from government integration and info sharing will continue to be
incentives for governments to design and implement initiatives to reduced duplication of data,
more coordinated efforts, and efficiency. Although Dawes (1996) classified them into three
categories, in terms of benefits as outcomes only, some other elements suggested by other
researchers are active public participation, transparency, efficiency, cost savings, policy
effectiveness, and service quality (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2010; Fedorowicz, 2009; Garson,
2004; Luna-Reyes, 2010; Reddick, 2009). However, the literature suggests that organizational
benefits are the more powerful incentives for government agencies in info sharing, particularly in
terms of efficiency and cost savings. In contrast, public organizations place more emphasis on
policy effectiveness, equity, openness, and accountability, from which enhancement can occur
through information integration (Gil-Garcia, 2012). Political benefits from government info
sharing are enhanced public image, value creation, increased government transparency and
accountability; integrated planning and more comprehensive public information. Efficiency,
being the goal of public administration, could be easily accepted as the justification of the
necessity of government info sharing (Wenjing, 2011).
Sharing relevant, timely, and complete information for intelligence operations transforms
the capability of intelligence systems to facilitate government info sharing and integration in a
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networked environment. From a military intelligence or even a business operations perspective,
the more this information is complete, the more it offers the government, corporate entities, and
their partners a real opportunity to share databases and make decisions based on the sharing of
information. In addition, it offers important benefits, such as increased productivity, improved
decision-making, and lower administrative burden, assuming that information already held
somewhere in the inter- or intra-agency is not duplicated. Further, it offers better enforcement
or greater information availability, higher information quality resulting in fewer mistakes, and
integrated services (Gil-Garcia et al., 2009; Jhingram, Mattos, & Pirahesh, 2002; Landsbergen &
Wolken, 2001; Otjacques, Hitzelberger, & Feltz, 2007).
In summary, Gil-Garcia (2012) argues that the important benefits of government info
sharing in the current government environments leads to the need for solutions consistent with
what he refers to as the “whole-of-government approach.” In fact, Gil-Garcia (2012) suggests a
need for more coordination and collaboration among government agencies, but also between
government agencies and other social actors to realize the benefits from info sharing. Again, this
specifically highlights the importance of the use of info sharing across organizational boundaries
and the sharing of critical information in order to solve complex problems. To this end, the
primary gain of the efficiency benefit as well as others mentioned throughout the literature, the
trend is towards increased inter-organizational collaboration and information integration among
government agencies, between government agencies (intra-agencies), other branches of
government, national partners, and corporate organizations. Gil-Garcia (2012) postulates that,
over the next 10 years, we could witness the emergence of a highly integrated virtual State in
which all branches of government and multiple social actors seamlessly interact through the use
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of sophisticated technologies that integrate business processes, physical infrastructure,
organizational resources, and new institutional arrangements.
There are many influences on inter- and intra-agency info sharing. Yang and Maxwell
(2011), suggest this type of sharing can viewed from a layered approach. In Figure 1, Factors
Influencing Organization Info sharing, the influences to info sharing for the focus of this
research are on the member’s beliefs, and characteristics of information. IT focuses primarily on
the technological issues, which dominate much of the early literature, and suggests that IT could
play a central role in the management of an organization’s info sharing. Hislop (2002) posits
there are criticisms to the literature, which overemphasizes the technological issues and neglects
social and cultural factors that can lead to a number of problems.
Figure 1: Factors Influencing Organization Info Sharing (Yang and Maxwell, 2011)

Organizational Structure:
Bureaucracy, Centralization,
Formalization/Formal Systems

Information Technology:
PU, PEOU, and IT Usage

Layer 1

Characteristics of Information:
Size, Amount, Worth, and Types

Layer 2
Absorptive
Capability

Layer 3

Organizational Culture,
Ritual, and Norm

System of Reward
and Incentive

Member’s Beliefs:
Self interest and Cost-Benefit Analysis,
Information Ownership or Information
Stewardship, and Reciprocity

Power Games
Social Identity
Social Network
Trust

Intra-Agency Information
Sharing

The key in the analysis of Yang and Maxwell’s (2011) research study is that, while info sharing
is influenced by the factors in layers one and two, members’ beliefs at layer three that are
focused towards intra-agency information sharing can be developed and mediated by self-interest
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and cost-benefit analysis. Although Figure 1 depicts the influences in intra-agency info sharing,
what is missing is the impact in the understanding of the attitude, intuition, and tacit knowledge
of the actor and the organization’s interest as it relates to the value of the information. The
influences are missing a critical element. The IA behavior influences the decision to share
information that may very well be in conflict with the organization’s security and info sharing
policies. The IA is, in fact, the entity that decides on the amount of risk that the organization
inherits. Thus, the main idea of this research is, if the user, whose decision is to share, is
someone knowledgeable about the risks versus the benefits, this may reflect a superior decision,
while the decision of someone who is less knowledgeable about the risks versus the benefits,
may be induced by behavioral biases. It has been argued that disclosure decisions are made by
balancing “the usefulness of privacy with the utility of openness” (Petronio, 2000, p. 37) and that
people engage in “disclosure management,” such that they disclose information only when they
expect a “net benefit” (White, 2004, p. 48).
In layer one, focus is on information technology, organizational structure, and
organizational cultures. Yang and Maxwell (2011) argue that bureaucracy is an influential
influence on info sharing. However, as a bureaucratic organization grows larger both vertically
and horizontally, distributed duties in different hierarchies and sub-units become the drivers of
decreased efficiency for info sharing. According to Creed, Douglas and Miles (1996) and Tsai,
2002, the formal hierarchical structure of bureaucracy can create barriers that impede info
sharing activities within the organization. Horizontal structures of bureaucracy, such as
departmentalization, inevitably bring obstacles to info sharing between different departments of
an organization because of different functional mandates, processes, and expectations (Argote,
Ingram, Levine, & Moreland, 2000; Willem & Buelens, 2007). In addition, bureaucracy is an
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organizational structure where power and authority are centralized in higher management levels
(Hall & Tolbert, 2004; Kim & Lee, 2006). Tsai (2002) argues that centralization has a significant
negative impact on knowledge sharing in a multiunit organization. Kim and Lee (2006) point out
that centralization can hinder initiatives of inter-group information exchange and collaboration.
Interest in sharing information and knowledge can be reduced because an organizational member
or group has limited action autonomy and needs approval from supervising levels regarding most
decisions (Kim & Lee, 2006).
In layer two, primary focus is on the characteristics of information, absorptive capability,
incentives, power, social aspects and trust. Yang and Maxwell (2011) argue that researchers
assert the importance of incentive systems in motivating organizational members to share
information with others in different groups or departments (Willem & Buelens, 2007). Through
direct and indirect effects of incentives, sharing of information and knowledge can be greatly
increased (Connolly, Thorn, & Heminger, 1992; Jian & Jeffres, 2006; Willem & Buelens, 2007).
With performance-based reward systems, organizational members are more likely to share
information and knowledge (Kim & Lee, 2006). Bonus systems are also able to increase the
quality of shared information (Ardichvill et al., 2003). On the other hand, researchers discovered
that when the system is not specifically designed for encouraging info sharing, a general reward
or incentive system can actually deter the info-sharing activities of an organization (Zhang et al.,
2005). Bock, Zmud, Kim and Lee (2005a) claim that anticipated extrinsic rewards can have
negative influence on organizational members' attitudes toward sharing of information and
knowledge. Barua, Ravindran and Whinston (2007) assert that general incentive systems can
only increase info-sharing activities when a special type of information dependency exists
between workgroups. Because of reward and incentive systems, workgroups and/or
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organizational members may compete with each other for better performance; one potential
consequence of this is that they might become reluctant to share information and knowledge
(Barua, Ravindran & Whinston, 2007; Bock et al., 2005a; Zhang, Dawes & Sarkis, 2005).
Finally, in layer three, lie members’ beliefs. According to Constant et al. (1994), member
perceptions of self- interest can reduce support for info sharing in an organization. Cress and
Kimmerle (2006) claim that info sharing presents a social dilemma. Social dilemmas are
situations where personal interests are inconsistent with collective interests. According to Yang
and Maxwell (2011), in social dilemmas, individuals are assumed to put more weight on their
short-term personal interests than on long-term organizational interests (Dawes, 1980).
Researchers point out many factors that organizational members may consider as costs to their
sharing of information (Cress & Kimmerle, 2006; Goodman & Darr, 1998). For instance, before
sharing tacit information and knowledge, a contributor may need to spend significant time and
effort to articulate, prepare and arrange the information. In addition, a contributor may expect
that sharing of information would evoke requests for further clarifications and assistances. The
extra work may compete with the contributor's work time and resources. Furthermore, the fear of
incurring criticism because of possible inaccurate and irrelevant information also affects the
cost/benefit equation (Ardichvill et al., 2003). Without receiving clear recognition and benefit for
a contribution, contributors may be reluctant to share information (Cress & Kimmerle, 2006;
Goodman & Darr, 1998). By applying theories of collective action (Hardin, 1971, 1982) and
social dilemma (Dawes, 1980; Jian & Jeffres 2006) extend the discussion by claiming that
individuals are rational and self-interested, acting to maximize individual benefits and minimize
individual costs. In their proposed utilitarian perspective, a contribution to the collective good
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such as sharing of information and knowledge is a matter of calculation and compromise
between cost and benefit (Jian & Jeffres, 2006; Marks et al., 2008)

THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR
3.1 Key Constructs of Theory of Planned Behavior
“Since its introduction 26 years ago, the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), has, by any
objective measure, become one of the most frequently cited and influential models for the
prediction of human social behavior” (Ajzen, 2011, p. 1113). In the TPB, the most detailed
substantive information about the determinants of a behavior is contained in a person’s
behavioral, normative and control beliefs. The theory does not specify where these beliefs
originated; it merely points to a host of possible background factors that may influence the
beliefs people hold. These are factors of a personal nature, such as personality and broad life
values; demographic variables, such as education, age, gender and income; and exposure to
media and other sources of information. Factors of this kind influence intentions and behavior
indirectly by their effects on the theory’s more proximal determinants. Most empirical studies
assess a few demographic characteristics if only considered as control variables. Some studies,
however, focus on one or more background factors that, for intuitive or theoretical reasons, are
relevant to the behavior under investigation. This research study will focus on IA attitudes and
intuition beliefs. The adaptation of the TPB in the exploration of behavioral, normative, and
control beliefs allows investigators the opportunity to identify important determinants of socially
significant behaviors, thereby gaining a better understanding, according to Ajzen (2012), of how
we might go about modifying behavior in a desirable direction.

3.2 Applications of Theory of Planned Behavior
A good application of TPB is reported by the study of Manning and Bettencourt (2011).
The investigators used the TPB as their conceptual framework to examine adherence to a
39
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medical regimen. Unlike Kor and Mullan (2011), who dealt with their behavioral category of
sleep-related activities by assessing the TPB constructs in relation to each behavior, Manning
and Bettencourt (2011) aggregated several regimen adherence behaviors and then assessed the
TPB constructs with reference to the category as a whole. Within their case, the intentions to
adhere were predicted very well, but the theory accounted for only a small proportion of variance
in behavior. However, in addition to measuring the TPB constructs, the investigators also
assessed depressive symptoms as a possibly relevant background factor. The results indicated
the degree of depression correlated negatively with intentions and reported adherence to the
medical regimen.
Other investigators in research studies (Courneya, Bobick, & Schinke, 1999; Courneya &
McAuley, 1993; Rhodes & Courneya, 2003; Rivis, Sheeran, & Armitage, 2011) examined the
role of specific personality traits in TPB (openness, conscientiousness, extroversion,
agreeableness and neuroticism) in the context of the TPB. These research studies assessed the
general tendency to compare oneself to important others. The results provide a different
perspective from simply postulating a simple effect of the background factors on intentions and
behavior, and their approach and method allowed them to examine the possibility that these
variables influence the predictive validity of intentions relative to perceived prototype similarity.
These investigations, like other studies (Sheeran, Orbell, & Norman, 1999; Trafimow & Finlay,
1996), show that there may be stable individual differences that influence the relative weights of
the different predictors in the TPB.
Even though TPB has emerged as one of the most influential and popular conceptual
frameworks for the study of human action (Ajzen, 2001; Ajzen, 2011, 2012), there are problems
that remain (Armitage & Conner, 1999, 1999a; Sheeran et al., 1999; Sutton, 1998). One such
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problem is the nature and measurement of perceived behavioral control. Since TPB is derived
from TRA, it is assumed that most human social behavior is under volitional control and,
therefore, can be predicted from intentions alone. The construct of perceived behavioral control
was added in an attempt to deal with situations in which people may lack compete volitional
control over the behavior of interest. The arguments suggest that behaviors can be subject to
unforeseen obstacles, and volitional control over behavior is, therefore, best considered as a
matter of degree rather than an actual type of behavior. Other arguments are on the specific
facets that form perceived behavioral control that may include self-efficacy, perception of
control and others.

In addition, researchers argue whether future behavior should be observed

or self-reported. The results within the literature suggest a gap exists between intention and
behavior, and many researchers concluded that some elements are apparently missing in the
model and have tried to enrich it by the inclusion of further constructs, such as moral norms and
past behavior. In response to these criticisms, Ouellette and Wood (1998) argue and confirm that
a relationship between past behavior and intention exist under special circumstances. “In
domains that facilitated development and execution of habits, past behavior was a strong
predictor and intention relatively weak, In domains that did not facilitate habits, past behavior
was a relatively weak direct predictor and intention was quite strong” (Ouellette & Wood, 1998,
p. 66). As such, though TPB may have shortcomings like all social theories, these shortcomings
must be recognized, and the criticisms do not prevent it from being an effective tool in
examining socio-technical process in organizations.

3.3 Theory of Planned Behavior and Decision-Making
The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) uses background factors to analyze individuals’
attitude, intuition, past behavior, and beliefs that affect their decision-making. Hodgkinson,
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Sadler-Smith, Burke, Claxton, and Sparrow (2009a, p. 277) noted that, until recently, only the
“bravest and most far-sighted” would recognize the utility of intuition in management decisionmaking. However, it is argued that increased time pressure, rising work pressure and ambiguity,
high decisions costs, inadequate information, and fast-paced change have undermined the utility
and effectiveness of relational decision-making models (Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005). It is also
argued that the changing nature of work practices and structures creates environments where
human information-processing capability is exceeded by the volume and complexity of the
information that humans have to process (Hodgkinson et al., 2009a), thereby, according to Allen
(2011), making intuition a more widespread strategy for decision-making. Allen (2011) further
defines intuition as having the following information processing characteristics: reliance on longterm memory input processed automatically and sub-consciously or pre-consciously, input is
holistic, and output from the process is feelings that can serve as a basis for judgments in
decisions. Therefore, Allen (2011) postulates that intuition can be seen as a distinct and very
different mechanism for information processing and decision-making.
Using the TPB framework, Ajzen (2011) describes that human behavior is guided by
different subjective probabilities. As depicted in Figure 2, the framework is based on the
assumptions of: 1) beliefs about the consequences of the behavior; 2) beliefs about the normative
expectations of other people; and 3) beliefs about the presence of factors that may facilitate or
impede performance of the behavior. In Figure 2, the background factors, or actor’s personal
beliefs, may include a wide range of factors. This research study will focus on the background
factors of IAs’ attitudes, intuition, and their experiences. Ajzen and Fishbein (1973) argue in the
TPB framework that the aggregation of background factors the behavioral beliefs produce
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attitude towards behavior, normative beliefs result in subjective norms and control beliefs
generate perceived behavior control.
Figure 2: Theory of Planned Behavior, (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1973)
Attitude
(Behavior Beliefs)

Background
Factors

Subject Norm
(Normal
Beliefs)

Behavioral
Intention

Perceived
Behavior Control
(Control Beliefs)

The combination of all the elements leads to the formation of a behavioral intention (Ajzen,
2011; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2005; Ajzen & Martin, 1970). An important postulation comes from the
research done by Ouellette and Wood (1998), which confirmed a relationship between past
behavior and intention under special circumstances (Ajzen, 2011). The combination of all the
elements leads to the formation of a behavioral intention (Ajzen, 2011; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2005;
Ajzen & Martin, 1970). “In domains that facilitated development and execution of habits, past
behavior was a strong predictor and intention relatively weak. In domains that did not facilitate
habits, past behavior was a relatively weak direct predictor and intention was quite strong”
(Ouellette and Wood, 1998, p. 66). IA actions are typically triggered by environmental events
and, because their activities are repetitive, their performance often requires minimal attention,
because of experience over time, but certainly requires deliberate control. According to
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Ouellette and Wood (1998), this is habitual behavior and past behavior may be a strong
predicator, where intention may be relatively weak.
With its roots in social psychological approach to behavior, TPB postulates changing
behavior is a matter of changing the cognitive structure underlying the behavior in question. The
theories are best seen as a series of four hypotheses. The first hypothesis is made under the
assumption that behavior is primarily a function of an individual’s intention to perform that
behavior. The second hypothesis is the intention to perform the behavior and is seen as a
function of the weighted combination of two factors, a personal factor that is the attitude toward
the behavior and a social factor that is referred to as subjective norm. Thus, in this hypothesis,
the attitude toward the behavior is the feeling of favorableness toward the behavior and the
subjective norm, which suggests the perception that people of importance think that the
individual should or should not perform the behavior. The third hypothesis suggests the
underlying attitude toward the behavior is an underlying cognitive structure of behavioral beliefs
that performing the behavior will lead to certain outcomes and the evaluation of these outcomes.
Finally, the last hypothesis suggests the subjective norm is an underlying cognitive structure of
normative beliefs that particular individuals or groups think that one should or should not
perform the behavior and the individual’s motivation to comply with each of these significant
others.

RESEARCH DESIGN
4.1 Subjects
As mentioned before, this study will endeavor to answer the question: How does the IA
navigate the paradox between the between the benefits and risks affected by individual behaviors
and organizational factors that inhibit information sharing decisions? A conjecture of this
research study is that the info sharing of highly skilled or smart sharers would reflect superior
decisions on the information to share, while the decisions of relatively less skilled or risky
sharers are more likely to be induced by behavioral biases. However, the central gap where
previous literature has given minimal consideration is the behavioral changes in users who share
information in understanding the analysis of the risks and benefits as it relates to sharing
information, as well as the reasons users are willing to share information with others, even when
the risk may outweigh the benefits. As such, it is a study of the social, cultural, and behavioral
aspects of the IA and inter-/intra-agency organizational security and info sharing policies. It
seeks to understand why IA make the decision to share information and how they do it. It
endeavors to understand the context within which they make decisions when analyzing the cost
and benefit trade-off as it relates to putting the organization at risk inadvertently or intentionally.
The IA navigates the paradox between the benefits and risks affected by their behaviors
and organizational factors that inhibit their info sharing decisions by performing and managing
intelligence activities and functions including developing, evaluating, and providing intelligence
information. To accomplish this, they instruct air crews on collecting and reporting requirements
and procedures; matters such as evasion, recovery, and code of conduct; recognition techniques;
and assessing offensive and defensive weapon system capabilities. They also prepare mission
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reports, conduct intelligence debriefings of U.S. and allied military personnel involved in combat
operations requiring careful analysis of the benefits and risks associated with successful
execution of missions. Since this unique group within the IC often prepares, maintains, and
presents intelligence displays, reports, and briefings and is responsible for producing all-source
intelligence, situation estimates, order-of-battle studies, and other intelligence reports and
studies, it represents important actors that navigate the paradox between the benefits and risks
that are affected by their behaviors and the organization’s factors that inhibit their info sharing
decisions. In navigating the paradox, this actor group also performs geo-locational mensuration
functions, maintains, and uses geospatial databases, targets materials, imagery, and other
intelligence products shared within the IC. These actors extract coordinates and positional
relationships from digital database systems and non-automated stereo-photographic models, and
identify and establish unit requirements for intelligence reference materials typically stored in
databases and for sharing. They also maintain intelligence reference files, automated intelligence
databases, automated and non-automated systems applications, target materials data logs and
prepare target materials for execution that includes performing targeting, weaponry, and damage
assessment functions.
The IA group is important to this research study as opposed to typical IT users because of
their specialty skill, mandatory knowledge, and system access. They are knowledgeable in
intelligence organizations and systems; collection and reporting systems, procedures, and
methods; intelligence information sources; techniques of identifying, collating, evaluating, and
analyzing information as well as geographical and cultural aspects of foreign countries. They are
required to be skilled at military capabilities of potential enemy offensive and defensive weapon
systems; special operations; procedures for acquiring, updating, and maintaining intelligence
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documents, maps, and charts; map and chart use techniques; graphic, oral, and written
intelligence information presentations; target planning and materials; target folder construction
techniques; and capabilities and application of automated data handling and management
systems. They must also understand security classification marking and control; U.S. sensor
systems, regional physical characteristics relative to radar significance; methods of verifying
target intelligence information derived from imagery; basic electromagnetic theory;
computerized systems supporting target intelligence and mission planning systems; digital terrain
and feature databases; and principles of precise positioning systems and targeting and
weaponeering.
IA use IT to help navigate the paradox between the benefits and risks of info sharing.
The information held by IA alone is not as useful if it is not shared in the IC and the technology
associated with information is generally oriented to the efficient transfer of that information to
another individual or entity. IA capitalize on the speed of processing information, manipulation
of large data sets, and dynamic adaptability to other IA needs. With the speed of processing, IA
benefit from the correlation of data, its manipulation, with less redundancy resulting in gaining
efficiency, and greater access across the community. IT also allows for the efficient storage and
retrieval of information as well as enables the possibility of efficient info sharing by allowing
electronic data to flow around the IC and around the world at the speed of light. An important
aspect to navigating the paradox between the benefits and risks of info sharing is to increase the
effectiveness and efficiency in sharing information. IA must consider access, which is part of
the analysis in navigating the risks and benefits for effectiveness and efficiency. The access to
shared information across a large and unique community allows efficiency as well as greater
capability for accomplishing missions effectively. It also allows building of partnerships with
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others to share information. IA must also navigate the paradox through military service
organizations, national partners, and other government partners since these environments are
unpredictable during operational missions. IA often cannot anticipate the nature of the demands
of info sharing they will face. Analysis of the benefits and risks in the info sharing paradox in an
ad hoc environment adds weighted pressure to IA decisions. These ad hoc environments are
characterized by collaborative working, unlimited communication across all levels, and broad
sharing of situation information. In situations of time pressure, IA do not fall back on wellestablish routines, each doing what it is they are best doing. To the contrary, there is a
behavioral change when sharing information in understanding the analysis of the benefits and
risks as it relates to sharing information; specifically, reasons IA may be willing to share
information with others, even when the risks may outweigh the benefits.

4.2 Information Theory Adaptation
The qualitative approach uses the adaptation of the TPB to inform this research to
provide a deeper insight into the decision-making process by IA, highlighting the moderating
impact of past behavior on the self-efficacy-intention linkage. In Figure 3, the conceptual
framework, the IA benefits and risks analysis is moderated by organizational factors (security
and info sharing policies) and behavioral intentions (attitude, values, and intuition), which
influence info sharing decisions that result in desirable or undesirable outcomes. What would
cause an IA to violate the rules and share information? How much does the behavioral intention
influence his/her decision? Kidwell and Jewell's (2008) research study confirms that, on the one
hand, past behavior does influence consumer decisions, and on the other “can influence the
extent of deliberative processing when making decisions.” In other words, past behavior
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obviously moderates the influence “… of attitude and internal and external control on intention”
(Kidwell & Jewell, 2008, p. 1162). In TPB, the assumption is that a decision is the result of a
deliberative, goal-oriented process; behavioral options considered, consequences of the option
evaluated and the decision to do something made. Will an IA demonstrate risky behaviors?
Gibbsons, Gerrad, and Lane (2003) developed the Prototype-Willingness Model (PWM) based
on three assumptions about risky behaviors among adolescents and young adults. Gibbsons et al.
(2003) posited risky behavior is neither reasoned nor intentional, which led to additional
constructs of TPB with the predictors of behavioral expectations and behavioral willingness.
Figure 3: Conceptual Framework
Organization Factors
(Security, Info
Sharing Policies)
Information
Sharing
Decision

IA Analysis
of Risks and
Benefits

Type of
Outcome

Behavior Factors
(Personal Beliefs,
Intuition)

IA access to information processing is approved based on security clearance level, need
to know, and system access to the appropriate classification levels of the information. Generally,
an IA has access to data at three classification levels: Unclassified, Secret, and Top Secret.
Although there are other compartmented classifications within each of the general levels of
access, the focus of this research study is on the access to information at these three general
levels. It is important to understand how an IA attempts to process information since it is part of
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his/her internal process to decision-making. According to Neisser (1967), most people operate in
a perception-action cycle, suggesting that the senses take in information from the environment,
the mid brain performs computations on that information and the outputs of those computations
are used to guide subsequent goad-directed actions. However, Newell and Broder (2008) argue
that, since most people’s information capacity is limited, they must use cognitive models to
propose heuristics or shortcuts.
The organization’s security and info sharing policies have increased in complexity when
sharing across an intra-/inter-agency. First, it changes rapidly with the increasing need for intra/inter-agency sharing of information. There are partnerships that form and disband based on an
organization’s interest and mission execution. At any moment, a partnership must be formed
under the conditions that info sharing is necessary based on a new agreement between the U.S.
and a national partner because of the relationship in a particular environment that is later
disbanded under the conditions that the partner now puts the organization at risk. The
organization’s need for sharing information often changes and is often unclear at different levels
within the organization or across inter-/intra-agencies. At various levels, organizations have
strict policies to sharing information, but they are created generically at very high levels and
execution is done at much lower levels and could very well be left to different interpretations by
individuals that could put the organization at risk. These types of conditions intensify when
considering how IA seek information to share. Savolainen (2006) schematic model for
information seeking highlights what IA face, in addition to understanding the organization’s
security and info sharing policies. Savolainen (2006) posits they are processing the following
continuously: 1) concerns with the problem or task at hand to collect intelligence information for
analyzing; 2) concerns with fulfilling the need of the IC for what has been just analyzed and
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shared; 3) considering and identifying potentially relevant information sources and channels; 4)
selecting and accessing information sources from intra- and inter-agency partners; 5) judging the
relevance of the information to be shared; 6) interpreting the information to be shared to be
appropriately classified; and 7) determining if new or modified information is necessary, based
on classification and the intended source of the shared information. These are all important
factors that affect IA decision-making, particularly given the limited amount of time that he/she
has in certain environments.
The organization’s security and info sharing policies are used to steer info sharing events
and serve as the foundation for how to access information for operations, as well as how, when,
and why an IA would share information with others. The organization’s policies and goals are in
the best interests of the organization to limit the risk of loss of information inadvertently or
intentionally, and, most important, to protect the information shared with sources that will not be
harmful to national defense. Also within the organization’s security and info sharing setting,
there is information processing during collection and distribution where the consumption triggers
the desire for power by decision-makers. In the info sharing setting, having control over access
to pieces of information and how and what is shared is power in the IC, particular in battle or
conflict with the adversary. In the behavioral sciences, power is defined as the ability to
influence others in a way that is desirable to the one exerting the influence (Ahituv & Carmi,
2007). This is important because, in the info sharing setting, exerting influence on another is not
necessarily based on an individual’s rank or authority, but more on the pieces of information
known by the IA and the ability to influence him/her to the desired outcome. Often the desired
outcome that strongly influences an IA to share information is successful execution of an
operational mission. The relationship between power and info sharing may cause the IA to
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engage in an inward-focused processing style characterized by attention to the self’s internal
attitudes and desires, with little consideration for the views and needs of others. This is
important because the internal attitudes and desires influence the decision to share or not to
share. Brinol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, and Becerra (2007) postulated that by priming power, which
is providing control over the evaluation of a subordinate in a role-playing task, prior to
processing a message about a topic, enhances the tendency to try to validate one’s initial views
on the topic that results in reduced information processing. Research on the organizational
cultural values’ view of power is that it is interpersonal and something that is used for advancing
one’s personal agenda obtaining praise and admiration from others, and, hence, maintaining and
promoting one’s powerful status in the eyes of others. However, it also can be organizational
driven, specifically when the primary focus is to accomplish the organization’s goals or
objectives, such as successful execution of an operational mission.
The assumption is the value of the information with regards to national defense is already
pre-determined, given the classification level of the information; however, in the info sharing
paradox, an IA contribution is often able to influence the usefulness of a piece of information for
others. For example, an IA may prepare the information very carefully to make it valuable for
the specific purpose for a unique group, or he/she may just contribute to the analysis of a
photograph needed for a specific mission. In many cases, higher value of pieces of information
for the organization means higher risks to the organization, but does not correspond with higher
risk for the IA. Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001) demonstrated that individuals in
social dilemmas consider their own benefits, but also the benefit to others in making decisions.
In the study by Cress, Kimmerle, and Hesse (2006), participants were provided with two types of
information: information with high value to others and information with low value to others.
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The study demonstrated that people do, in fact, consider the benefit to others, and contribute
more information of high value than information of low value.
Since IA perform and manage Intelligence activities and functions, including developing,
evaluating, and providing Intelligence information in info sharing situations, they often influence
the usefulness of this data for others. With the information being more valuable to others, which
is continuously gaining value by contributions by all within the IC, the organization’s investment
is even higher with national Intelligence libraries where IA can seek and retrieve data
individually. Individually, the information contributed is often labeled and can be traced to the
IA responsible for the contribution, and tagged appropriately for the proper classification, such
as unclassified, secret, or top secret. The labeling and tagging ensures the proper classification,
but does not take into account the contribution to the entire community and is not higher in value
from the perspective of the contributing IA, who is only focused on his/her single source of
information and its classification. For example, an IA may develop and evaluate a map for a
particular target and place it in a national Intelligence library classified at the lowest
classification level for a high rate of sharing. A different person could retrieve the work
completed by the previous individual and add important pieces of information keeping it at the
lowest classification level as possible. However, the additional information added to the map
involves multiple targets; therefore, the information returned to the library results in a higher
value or higher classification. The info sharing process then generated information of much
greater value to the IC, but not necessarily to the developer of the product focused on his/her
piece of the information.
Some researchers (McClintock, 1978; Messick & McClintock, 1968) posited that human
behavior is influenced by values that people assign to different action alternatives and their
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consequences. What is the behavior that influences an IA to share classified material with others
not authorized? Could this behavior have been influenced by values unconsciously inherited
from being a member of the IC, practicing the mandated security and info sharing policies? Or
could it have been influenced by another IA as social peer pressure that impacts the IA’s
decisions and actions resulting in success or failures? In TPB, the most detailed substantive
information about the determinants of a behavior is contained in a person’s behavioral,
normative, and control beliefs. What are the most influential behavioral factors in the decisionmaking of IA when sharing information with others? Are there differences in the decisionmaking when an IA believes the recipient has authorization versus no authorization? (Allport,
1935, 1968) pointed out that the concept of attitude “is probably the most distinctive and
indispensable concept in contemporary American social psychology” (1968, p. 59). With this
understanding, often, consequences of action alternatives will not only affect the actors
themselves but also others, most important, the IC. Using TPB, these values include an actor’s
background factors (social, personal, information) and beliefs (behavior, normal, control).
The background and beliefs of an individual represent a behavior intention, as well as a
stable preference for distribution outcomes (inadvertent, desired, or intentional) between one’s
own self and the organization. The background factors and individual beliefs are extremely
important influencing factors in the conflict between the behavior of IA and the organization’s
security and info sharing policies in the paradox of information sharing. Do IA consider their
own benefits and risks in sharing information but also the benefit and risks to the organization?
Will they contribute more information of high value than information of low value? The logical
answer is that IA may very well, in their decision to share information, consider the benefit and
risks to others. This could result in contributing more information of value or higher
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classification that benefits an IA during a successful mission, but violates the organization’s
security and info sharing polices to do so. On the other hand, it may be consistent with the
organization’s security and info sharing policies, resulting in sharing information of low value or
lower classification, but also in an unsuccessful mission.
As mentioned, this research focuses on the social, cultural, and behavioral aspects of IA
and inter-/intra-agency organizational security and info sharing policies. Is the loss of
information publicly and the decisions made to share this information inadvertent or intentional?
Do IA consider the benefit to other Intelligence sources, and contribute more information of high
value than information of low value that puts the organization at risk? The researcher selected an
exploratory approach and the theoretic operational mission-based scenario events because they
are similar in mission and impact to the gravity in actual loss of valuable information, yet
different in terms of info sharing, decision-making, level of authority and responsibility,
organizational structure, and consequences endured from the sharing of information. Given the
similarities, this study will use literal replication logic to look for similarities within each
scenario and likewise, given the differences, use theoretical replication logic to identify
contrasts, if possible, between organizations within the IC (Yin 2009, p. 54). Though combining
literal and theoretical replication does not ensure generalizability of the study, it may add to the
robustness and confidence in the findings (Yin, 2009). The empirical part of the research will be
informed by the interviews conducted and analyzed from responses to these particular mission
scenarios. Interviews, that is, empirical data collection, may also be informed by recent events
because we do not have a lot of knowledge in these areas. Therefore, in lieu, we will explore
using the theoretic mission scenario-based empirical data to uncover the unknown, to answer
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questions, to identify the relationship that the past has to the present, and to assist in
understanding the culture in which we live.
As engaged scholarship, this research adopts a critical realist philosophy of science. As
described by Van de Ven (2007a, pp. 37-38), this view adopts an objective ontology that there is
a real world out there but that our individual understanding is limited. This view also espouses,
however, a subjective epistemology where all facts, observations and data are capable of being
adapted to acceptable theory; no form of inquiry can be value-free and impartial; understanding
complex reality demands the use of multiple perspectives; evidence may converge but might also
be inconsistent or contradictory; and, models are selected that better fit the problem they are
intended to solve.
With this assumption of a subjective epistemology, the researcher conducted the study
using the seven fundamental principles recommended by Klein and Myers (1999). Drawn from
anthropology, phenomenology, and hermeneutics, these principles include the principles of
hermeneutic circle (understanding is achieved by iterating between the interdependent meaning
of parts and the whole they form); contextualization (critical reflection upon the social and
historical background of the research setting); interaction between the researchers and the
subjects (critical reflection on how the data were socially constructed through interaction
between the researchers and participants); abstraction and generalization (relating the idiographic
details to the application of theory); dialogical reasoning (sensitive to possible contradictions
between theoretical preconceptions and actual findings); multiple interpretations (sensitivity to
possible differences in interpretations by participants); and, suspicion (sensitivity to biases and
distortions in narratives collected from participants). As Klein and Myers (1999) point out, these
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principles are interdependent and the researcher did not apply these principles mechanically but
rather used the researcher’s own judgment.
Finally, in TPB, Ajzen (2012) argues the reasoned action approach explains human social
behavior in terms of considerations that are readily accessible when people think about
performing a behavior in question. He postulates that we gain an understanding of the factors
that motivate people’s behavior by examining their beliefs about the behavior’s likely
consequences and how these beliefs produce an attitude toward the behavior. He further
explains that, by considering their beliefs about the expectations and behaviors of important
others and how these beliefs lead to the formation of a subjective norm, and by studying their
beliefs about control factors, we can learn how these beliefs produce a sense of behavioral
control or self-efficacy. Ajzen (2012) suggests there is no real argument to suggest that people
make decisions in a rational fashion, but one may assumed that intentions and behavior follow
reasonably from these kinds of considerations, often spontaneously without a lot of cognitive
effort. A large body of empirical research attests to the predictive validity of the TPB. Various
techniques have been developed to increase behavioral control, although these techniques have
not been used in a TPB context. Some methods focus on imbuing individuals with a sense of
self-efficacy or perception of behavioral control. These methods can thus influence behavioral
intentions; that is, the motivation to engage in the behavior, but they may also provide valuable
information about actual behavioral performance.
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4.3 Research Methodology
4.3.1 Data Collection. This study follows the three principles of data collection
recommended by Yin (2009 p. 114-124): (a) using multiple sources of evidence; (b) creating a
case study database; and (c) maintaining a chain of evidence. To deepen the understanding and
help achieve satisfactory validity through data triangulation, the researcher collected data from
several sources with different data collection methods. The primary source of data includes
interviews and documents on the IC’s security and info sharing policies. The concentrating of the
research questions in the semi-structured interview guide seeks to understand why IA make the
decisions to share information and how they do it. The Theory of Planned behavior (TPB) uses
background factors to analyze individuals’ attitudes, intuition, past behavior, and beliefs that
affect their decision-making. TPB suggests that the changing nature of work practices and
structures creates environments where human information-processing capability is exceeded by
the value and complexity of the information that humans have to process, which suggests
intuition is a strategy for decision-making. The interview questions address whether an
individual uses intuition as an influencing factor to the decision. In addition, the questions are
situated to examine if past behavior does influence the analyst’s decisions and moderates the
influence and control on intention. TPB is based on the assumption that a decision is the result
of a deliberative, goal-oriented process; behavioral options are considered, consequences of the
option are evaluated and the decision to do something is made.
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4.3.2 Data Analysis Method. This study followed the data analysis procedures suggested
by Miles and Huberman (1994a) for qualitative case data. Miles and Huberman (1994b, pp. 1012) define data analysis as consisting of three concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data
display, and conclusion drawing and verification. These three types of analysis and the data
collection process form an interactive, cyclical process. This research study moved among the
four activities during data collection, data reduction, display and conclusion, and verification
throughout the life of the research. Miles and Huberman (1994b) describe data reduction as data
“condensation.” In this form of analysis, the researcher sharpens, sorts, focuses, discards, and
organizes collected data. During the interviews, an enormous amount of data was collected and
the researcher used Miles and Humberman’s (1994b) approach to focus and sharpen the
collected data. As suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994b), when appropriate and in order to
improve validity and help in analysis, the researcher used methods for summarizing (contact
summary sheets, document summaries, case analysis meetings, and interim case summaries);
different approaches to coding (at both descriptive and inferential levels); methods of thinking
about data (annotations and memoing); and methods for producing extended reports (vignettes
and pre-structured cases). In this research study, these methods were used continuously
throughout the life of the research and before fieldwork commenced through initial research
questions and the choice of a conceptual framework from which the researcher operated.
In applying these methods, there were three critical steps taken to establish an
environment to examine the behavior in the IA who shares information when analyzing the risks
and benefits as it relates to sharing information, as well as the reasons an IA is willing to share
information with others, even when the risks may outweigh the benefits. The purpose is to
examine the change in behaviors of IAs in their decision analysis of a typical intelligence
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operational, mission-based info sharing event. To create the appropriate environment, it was
important to develop actual operational mission-based scenario events that would serve as a basis
to examining IA behavior in deciding to share information while analyzing the benefits and risks
associated with sharing the information. Using actual Intel operational mission scenarios that
were previously conducted or currently being executed could not be used for the semi-structure
interviews since the scenarios could potentially classify the research study as well as put the IA
at risk of violating security policies.
However, it was important to develop theoretic mission-based scenarios that simulated
actual missions in complexity for critical thinking, effectiveness, and thoroughness, while
keeping the research study at the appropriate unclassified level. Therefore, the first step was
creating a working group of IAs from junior to senior levels to develop potential theoretic
operational mission based scenarios that simulated actual missions and would effectively serve
as the basis for examining IA behavior in deciding to share information while analyzing the
associated benefits and risks. The group was tasked to generate operational mission-based
scenarios that would cause IA to critically think what they would do in particular information
sharing situations in the IC when deciding whether to share or not share information with others
in the IC. They were also asked to take under consideration in generating the scenarios to also
formulate them where an IA would consciously consider any potential benefits and risks
associated with the decision when sharing the information with others. The group consisted of
eight professional IA who generated 10 scenarios that could potentially serve as the basis for use
in the research study. The theoretic operational mission-based scenarios collectively generated
by the working group had to pass a second level of review for use and release. Thus, the next
step in creating the appropriate environment consisted of submitting the scenarios to the
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respective Special Security Offices (SSO) for review and determination of releaseability, to
ensure they did not pose a threat to users or the IC, were not used in previous operational
missions, or were perceived as a potential effect on a future operational mission. Finally, after
review by SSO, three scenarios were determined as releasable and as simulating operational
missions, and were adopted for use in the research study.
Although the intelligence mission-based scenarios are theoretic, a group of IA evaluated
them as potential mission events that could serve as a basis to examining the behavior of an IA’s
decision when sharing information with others while analyzing the associated benefits and risks.
In any military battle, the formidable force is often the entity that has the most complete and
accurate information that is collected and shared among other reliable forces, but not the enemy.
However, although each entity may share information with trusted partners, each side faces
variations of information leakage, espionage, and political strife that affect the decision to share
information and that makes the information valuable in terms of power or less valuable over time
in terms of diminishing return on investment. The researcher proceeded with the group selected
theoretic operational mission-based scenarios because they would allow examination of the
actor’s decision and behavior intention. Will the actor evaluate risk (consequences) versus
benefits, consider the security and info sharing policies, or will the actor’s personal or subjective
norm be the controlling factors to the decision? These similarities and differences will allow the
researcher to combine literal and theoretical replication logic (Yin, 2009). In addition, to deepen
the understanding and to help achieve satisfactory validity, the researcher collected data from
several sources using different data collection methods, including formal interviews with IC
users, analysis of email correspondence, observations of recent events, and review of archival
documents.
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The interview data collected were analyzed interpretively using NVivo, a qualitative data
analysis (QDA) computer software package, to uncover subtle connections, rigorously justifying
findings, and to code. The overall decision-making of the subjects is based on the context of the
theoretic operation mission-based scenario environments. The mission-based scenario
environment provides the context for collective action as a network of interacting elements
governed by certain motives. The subjects engaged in decision-making activities for a reason or
reasons that form the motivation (such as to defend and protect the country or to simply support
a fellow IA). The outcome is the transformation of the decision; success or failure or intentional
or inadvertent release of information. The behavior of the subject is moderated by influences
from the security and info sharing policies and the individual’s beliefs (behavior intentions;
attitude and intuition). They interact to influence the IA’s analysis of the benefits and risks to the
info sharing decision. For example, the security and info policies, peer pressure, and mission
success influence a subject, but are also influenced by beliefs, experience, and tacit knowledge.
The researcher developed a semi-structured interview guide (See Appendix B) and
conducted formal, semi-structured interviews with IA in the IC. The researcher designed
theoretic mission-based scenarios that simulated an environment consistent with actual
operational missions. It provided a context where multiple and interdependent decisions are
made as a function of the decision-maker’s actions and/or in response to environmental events.
The questions were situated to understand the context in which the IA make these decisions,
specifically when analyzing the trade-offs between the benefits and risks, while at the same time
understanding the associated consequence as it relates to putting the organization at risk
inadvertently or intentionally. IA were randomly selected from journeyman, junior and senior
level grades within the military services and DoD civilians across the community based on their
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unique job specialty code. Once selected, the IA received an email asking if they would like to
participate in a research study, strictly voluntary.
There were 20 IA randomly selected and sent an email notification to participate
voluntarily in the research study. There were 18 IA that responded as volunteers, which
consisted of six journeymen, five junior, and seven senior IA. The subjects consisted of two
females and 16 males, equaling seven civilians and 11 military members. The IC subjects
consisted of a population of IA from the military service and IC agencies as follows: six in the
Air Force, three in the Army, one from the Defense Intelligence Agency, three in the CIA, one
from the NSA, two in the Navy, and one each from National Reconnaissance and National
Geospatial Agencies.
The interviews were private and conducted in separate and secure environments. All
subjects were interviewed in a location different from where they were currently employed. This
was to ensure subjects felt relaxed, without any peer pressure, and comfortable in providing
natural responses to the questions, and to help protect them from any scrutiny by an employee or
employer identifying them as a participant in the research study. The information was collected
using a digital recording device and later encrypted for security protection. The interviews lasted
between 20 and 30 minutes. The sessions of the subjects that were digitally recorded were later
transcribed and the digitally recorded data were destroyed. In addition, to maintain anonymity,
the subjects were made aware of the destruction of the digitally recorded data and that names
would not be used in the research study. This approach was to ensure the subject responses were
natural and not hindered by the idea that the information provided would be incriminating or
traceable to a single individual. Archival documents, such as website information, policy
documents, standards and guidelines, operating procedures, published instructions, ICD, and

64
published strategies and visions were used for corroboration and clarification on the data
collected through the interviews.
The subjects were given an option to randomly select from three different theoretic
operational mission-based scenarios. The subjects were asked to choose a number between one
and nine. If a subject’s selection was between the numbers one and three, it resulted in scenario
number two; if the selection was between four and six, it resulted in scenario number one, and; if
the selection was between the numbers seven and nine, it resulted in scenario number three.
After reading the scenario, the subject immediately answered the question that followed the
scenario and then later answered a list of eight additional questions. The questions were the
same for each scenario; however, since the interview was a formal semi-structured approach,
subjects’ responses did lead to additional inquires.

DATA ANALYSIS
5.1 Results
How do IA navigate the paradox between the benefits and risks affected by individual
behaviors and organizational factors that inhibit info sharing decisions? In addition, is there a
behavioral change, and why might IA share info with others, even when the risks may outweigh
the benefits? In this exploratory study, respondents were asked what their first instinct was in
their benefit and risk analysis in each of the operational scenarios. Displayed in Table 2 are the
subjects’ responses depicting their info sharing decisions from analyzing the theoretic
operational mission scenarios. There were a total of 18 subjects that reviewed and analyzed the
risks versus the benefits to sharing information and decided to share or not share information to
successfully accomplish an operational mission. After reading the respective scenarios, overall
responses to the questions immediately following the scenarios resulted in 10 out of 18 subjects
who actually shared the necessary information that actually violated security and info sharing
policies. Conversely, only two out of 18 subjects would not share information that was needed
to successfully execute the mission because of religious belief; meaning they were in noncompliance with their oath of office or enlistment and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
However, when the question was rephrased to replace one’s religious belief with an individual’s
sibling or a spouse, five out of 18 would not share the information needed.
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Table 2: Info Sharing Decision

Decision to Share Information
Mission

Number of Subjects
Responding (N=18)

Yes

No

Scenario 1
(Violation of IC Info Sharing Policy)

6

2

8

Scenario 2
(Incident/Security Violation)

4

0

4

Scenario 3
(Compliance with oath of office/enlistment and UCMJ)

4

2

6*

Total

14

4

18

* Rephrased question to replace religion with sibling or spouse

1

5

Scenario 1:
A communication between two foreign terrorists was acquired on 12 January
2008 using Executive Order (EO) 12333 collection.

You discover the

communication between the foreign terrorists includes vital raw Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) data (imagery) that a fellow Intel Analyst needs to
successfully execute a mission on 28 January 2013; however, under EO 12333,
the raw traffic is inaccessible to your fellow Analyst online because raw
SIGINT data is only retained for up to five years.

Since you were the

originator of the raw SIGINT data, you have the raw data necessary to assist
the Analyst in successful execution of the mission.

Do you share the

information with the Analyst to execute the mission successfully?
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Eight subjects selected and responded to Scenario 1. Five out of the six subjects
responded “yes,” they would share information with the other IA to execute the mission
successfully. Only two subjects referenced that the violation of EO 12333 would not allow
them to share information with the other IA. Typically, SIGNIT raw traffic is inaccessible after
five years and could be destroyed or must have a destruction waiver to maintain it for longer than
five years. In either case, since this scenario is intentionally situated beyond the five-year point,
so it requires additional authority for access and to determine availability. The specific intent
behind this question is to examine the actor’s decision and behavior intention. Will the actor
evaluate risk (consequences) versus benefit, consider the security and info sharing policies, or
will the actor’s personal or subjective norm be the controlling factors to the decision?

Scenario 2:
As an Intelligent Analyst, you served a tour in Afghanistan and had access to
classified information. During your tour, you were privy to information that
included imagery of raw SIGINT data tag, indicating that the legal authority
category is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), F? Amendment
Act (FAA). You have transferred to a new position as an IA. In your new
position, you noticed you still have access to the SIGINT data without the
appropriate re-justification. Simultaneously, during your discovery of your
continued access, you also notice traffic of a special operations mission that
requires use of the information under the legal authority of FAA. The target
is to capture foreign terrorist and you have access to the imagery of raw
SIGINT data that you can access and help with the capture of the terrorists.
You know the IA are slightly less skilled at Intel analysis since your departure
and have somehow missed the raw SIGINT data aggregation. Do you share
the information with your previous IA to help capture the terrorist?
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Four subjects selected and responded to Scenario 2. All four subjects responded “yes,”
they would share information with the previous IA to help capture the terrorist. This scenario
illustrates a reportable incident since the IA still has access to the data without re-justification.
The scenario suggests that, at the same time the IA discovers his/her access, discovery of a
mission being executed to which he/she can provide assistance is also identified. The IA knows
the appropriate skill set does not exist at the previous position and the unit will more likely lose
an opportunity to capture the terrorist if there is no engagement to assist by sharing analysis of
the information and the data from the intelligence library database. The rules are clear: if IA
discover they still have access, the IA must contact a manager to have his/her access removed
and inform leadership of the issue. In addition, since this involves Federal Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance, it must be reported because of legal authority under the act. The specific intent
behind this question is to examine the actor’s decision and behavior intention. Will the actor
evaluate risk (consequences) versus benefits and consider the security and info sharing policies,
or will the actor’s personal or subjective norm be the controlling factor to his/her decision?
Scenario 3:
As an IA assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency, you’re scheduled for
your deployment rotation to Afghanistan.

You and another IA are

collaborating on the analysis of targeting information for the area to which
you are being deployed. On your deployment, you are assigned to supporting
the Central Intelligence Agency.

You learned that the area you’re being

deployed to is in an area where you were originally born. In addition, on your
deployment, during collaboration with another Analyst, you learn a mission
will be executed that targets a particular asset that doesn’t necessarily reside
well with your religious faith or beliefs. The day of mission execution, the
junior Analyst develops the package for targeting from the analysis of the data
in storage. You review the analysis of the junior Analyst and realize there’s
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additional information needed that you collaborated on prior to your
departure for deployment. You are torn between your religious faith or belief
and successful execution of the mission. The current Analyst is less skilled
then you are and unaware of your prior analysis and your pertinent
information.

Do you share the information with the Analyst to ensure

successful execution of the mission? Do you share the information if the target
is where a sibling or spouse currently lives?
Six subjects selected and responded to Scenario 3. Four out of the six subjects responded
“yes,” that they would share information with the other IA to execute the mission successfully.
The other two subjects responded that they would “request separation of involvement and being
accountable in execution of the mission.” However, when followed up with rephrasing the
question to replace religious belief with a sibling or spouse, one subject stated “yes,” she would
still share information with the other IA to execute the mission. Five subjects stated “no,” they
would not share the information, and two of the responses were the same, stating they would
“request separation of involvement and being accountable in execution of the mission.” This
scenario examines where subjects may intuitively place their values: on the information they
intend to share or, in this particular scenario, on their religious faith or belief. In this particular
scenario, there are no rules being violated in sharing the information or not sharing the
information. However, if the Analyst chooses not to share because of religious faith or belief,
the Analyst would be in non-compliance with his oath of office or enlistment and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. The important dilemma in this scenario is that only the Analyst knows
that his/her decision to share or not to share the information is based on his religious faith or
belief. The basis for this question is to examine the actor’s decision and behavior intention. Will
he/she evaluate risk (consequences) versus benefits, consider his/her own personal values over
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those of the organization, and will his/her personal or subjective norm be the controlling factors
to his/her decision?
5.1.1 Results Data Analysis. How do IA navigate the paradox between the between the
benefits and risks affected by individual behaviors and organizational factors that inhibit info
sharing decisions? In addition, is there a behavioral change and why might IA share information
with others, even when the risks may outweigh the benefits? Table 3 displays the reasons given
by respondents as explanations for sharing information. It turns out that the administrative
pressure of security and information policies had only a small amount of influence on a subject’s
decision to share information; only two respondents mentioned administrative pressure. In
scenario one, two different responses from IA regarding their first instinct in their decision to
share or not share information was as follows:
Although the raw SIGINT data is inaccessible, I would be able to
talk about my experience and my knowledge with my fellow
analysts and tell them what I know, so I would share the
information that way . . . common sense or whatever says, hey, we
got lucky. Let’s go ahead and share it since we’re talking about
terrorists, you know. We’re not talking about, you know, like
citizens or any of that kind of stuff.
Yes I would . . . I felt like it was pretty easy . . . a necessity to the
mission. There may have been some restrictions I may have
violated, but the mission is more important.
Conversely, 16 of the respondents felt their decision to share information was mostly influenced
by the organization’s goal of successful execution of operational missions; meaning an IA’s first
thought is the perceived successful execution of the mission (since success is determined
afterwards). In addition, to ensure the perceived successful execution of the mission, IA sought
mission first and fix policy later to adjust to meet the mission needs as their approach to sharing
of information. They also viewed accuracy as a vital element to aid in the execution, potentially
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overlooking the importance of the value of information shared in the IC. The subjects were
asked in the theoretic operational based scenario execution of each mission, which was more
important, the accuracy of the data or the value of the information being shared? It turns out that
eight of the respondents thought providing accurate data during operational missions is more
important than the value of the information. In scenario one, the subject’s response is sought to,
what is more important, sharing of accurate data for mission accomplishment or understanding
the value of the information being shared? A subject responded with the following:
I would say ensuring accurate data is shared for mission
accomplishment . . . a lot of times getting the accurate data to the
right people who can determine the value is more important to
mission accomplishment. I may not necessarily have the knowledge
to know the value of the information, but if I can get that accurate
data to the people who’ve got more experience and analyze that
bigger data I would . . . you know, it’s more important to share it
than to understand it.
This is substantial in providing explanation for the subject’s response of feeling constrained by
security and info sharing policies; in fact, 10 of respondents felt constrained by the
organization’s policies, but not enough to avoid violating them. Remember, as displayed in
Table 2, 10 out 18 of the subjects actually violated the security and info sharing policies during
analysis of the operational mission-based scenarios. It also alludes to the explanation of why
subjects felt there was only a small amount of influence, and only two respondents felt
administrative pressure from security and info sharing polices on their info sharing decision;
subjects are not fully aware nor focused on the value of the information that requires protection
through the enforced security and info sharing policies.
In line with the subjects’ feeling of the perceived successful execution of the operational
mission, the feeling magnifies when it involves ensuring that others do not impede the perceived
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success. Thus, subjects felt compelled to assist others with sharing information that culminated
in the perceived successful execution of the operational mission; 14 of the respondents felt
compelled to share information with the other IA to ensure successful execution of the
operational mission. In scenario three, subjects responded whether they would share or not share
information with another junior analyst when it conflicted with religious belief. One IA’s
response was as follows:
My first instinct was to share the information because what he had
was wrong or lacking and I had additional information that would
provide clarity and ensure successful execution of the mission, but
it hurts, very painful, very painful concept and I’m conflicted . . .
for, you know, the rest of my life.
In the data analysis, it was important from an IA’s perspective that the organization
characterized the actions or viewed the info sharing decisions as positive. Even when the
subject’s info sharing decisions conflicted with the subject’s beliefs, when asked if they thought
the decisions aligned with the organization’s security and info sharing policies, respondents
thought mission first above all else.
Wow! . . . That depends on the leadership, how they review that
(positively or negatively), but how do you punish somebody who
comes forward and says hey listen, I’ve been involved with this
violation that resulted in successful execution of a mission. It’d be
more of a cover up afterwards . . . deniable plausibility.
Although subjects actually violated security and info sharing policies, most believed or
felt their actions aligned with the organization’s desired outcome of the perceived operational
mission success. In most cases, subjects’ beliefs were in conflict with the security and info
sharing policies; six of respondents felt conflicted, although the desire to obtain the
organization’s desired goal of mission success impacted their behavioral intention, and thus
influenced the decision to share information. However, if the stakes were too high, based on
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personal beliefs (values and intuition), subjects’ beliefs actually conflicted with the security and
info sharing policies. Only six of the respondents actually shared information where others’
beliefs (values and intuition) greatly influenced their decision not to share, which outweighed the
organization’s goal of operational mission success.
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Table 3: Info Sharing Reasons

Reasons Given for Sharing Information

Reasons/Motives

Number of
Respondents Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Mentioning
Items (N=18)

Pressure from others if mission was
unsuccessful

11

5

Felt compelled to help another IA

14

6

4

4

Execution of a successful mission is the
most important objective

16

8

4

4

Administrative pressure from security &
info security policies

2

2

Felt constrained by security & info policies

10

6

4

Mission first, fix policy later to adjust to
meet mission needs

16

8

4

Accuracy of data is more important than
the value of information

8

8

Beliefs conflicted with security and info
sharing policies

6

Experience/knowledge conflicted with
security & info sharing policies

6

Personal beliefs/values conflicted with
mission success
Total

6
95

6

4

6

6

6
49

16

30

DISCUSSION
The aim of this exploratory study was to examine the behavior of IA, and to investigate
the paradox of info sharing in the IC. Why do people share information with others; primarily,
what influences the individual’s decision that drives him/her to violate security and info sharing
policies? The understanding of IA behaviors allows a better understanding of how one might go
about modifying behavior in a desirable direction. The results provide support that background
factors do influence the beliefs people hold. These factors, attitudes and intuition and broad life
values, influence intentions; and, thus, an IA decision in info sharing. Hodgkisno, Salder-Smith,
Burke, Claston, and Sparrow (2009a, p. 277) noted that, until recently, only the “bravest and
most far-sighted” would recognized the utility of intuition in management decision-making.
Why did IA actually violate security and info sharing policies so easily? There is a major
external influence on IA in accomplishing the organization’s goal of mission success. IA
construct their own version of reality based on information provided by the senses, although this
sensory vision is moderated by complex mental processes that determine which information is
attended to, how it is organized, and the meaning attributed to it. According to Hodgkinson et
al., (2009a), the changing nature of work practices and structures creates environments where
human information-processing capability is exceeded by the volume and complexity of the
information that humans have to process; thus, intuition is a more widespread strategy for
decision-making (Allen, 2011). What people perceive, how readily they perceive it, and how
they process this information after receiving it, are all strongly influenced by past experience,
education, cultural values, role requirements, and organizational norms (the goal of successful
operational missions), as well as by the specifics of the information received.
75

76

6.1 Intuition
IA intuition relies on long-term memory input processed automatically and subconsciously or pre-consciously; input is holistic, and output from the process is feelings that
serve as the basis for judgments in decisions, all of which, according to Allen (2011), are
characteristics of information processing which is a distinct and different mechanism for
information processing and decision-making. This intuition, based on the results of the study,
conflicted with the organization’s security and info sharing policies, partly because the attitude
towards these security and info sharing policies hinders the perceived successful operational
mission. The results also provide support to IA actions triggered by environmental events and
because their activities are definitely not repetitive, and their performance requires greater
attention, even with experience over time where intuition is a strong influence on behavioral
intention. This is contrary to expectations as described by Outllette and Wood’s (1988)
postulation of habitual behavior, where past behavior may be a strong predicator and where
intention may be relatively weak. However, perceived behavioral control, part of TPB,
accommodates the non-volitional elements inherent in all behaviors. According to Ajzen (2002),
even when not particularly realistic, perceived behavioral control is likely to affect intentions. A
high level of perceived control strengthens a person’s intention to perform the behavior, and
increases effort and perseverance. Hence, attitude and intuition affect behavior indirectly, by its
impact on the intention of the decision. Accordingly, when perceived behavioral control is
veridical, it provides useful information about the actual control a person can exercise in the
situation, and can, therefore, be used as an additional direct predictor of behavior (Ajzen, 2002).
6.1.1 Relationships and beliefs. Another interesting result is the strong relationship
between one IA and another IA tangled together on the compelling need to support each other in
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the perceived successful execution of an operational mission. Self-efficacy beliefs affect thought
patterns that may be self-aiding or self-hindering. An IA behavioral intention in deciding to
share information is influenced by the perceived success or failure of the mission; thus, another
IA affects his attitude towards this effort as well as his mental model of the perceived outcome.
The more strongly people believe that a certain response will lead to a certain outcome and the
more positively they value that outcome, the stronger their intention to produce the response in
question (Ajzen, 2012); in this case, to share information, and, in some cases, magnifying the
violation, to execute a perceived successful operational mission. The self-efficacy beliefs
function as an important set of proximal determinants of human motivation, affect, and action.
Neither IA wants to fail in meeting the organization’s goal of successful execution of an
operational mission. Therefore, these self-efficacy beliefs are part of their motivational,
cognitive, and affective intervening processes in the behavioral intention, which influences the
decision to share information. Bandura (1989) postulates that people’s perceptions of their
efficacy influence the types of anticipatory scenarios they construct and reiterate. Those who
have a high sense of efficacy visualize success scenarios that provide positive guides for
performance. Those who judge themselves as inefficacious are more inclined to visualize failure
scenarios that undermine performance by dwelling on how things will go wrong.
IA beliefs in achieving mission success over violations of security and info sharing
policies are strongly influenced by the IA attitudes towards the policies as well as their intuition
of success or failure. This aligns directly as described by Bandura (1989) who argues it is widely
believed that misjudgment produces dysfunction and gross miscalculation can create problems.
His argument is, although optimistic self-appraisals of capability are not disparate from what is
possible can be advantageous (mostly advantageous for the organization), veridical judgments
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can be self-limiting. IA assess the risks versus the benefits in their analysis before deciding to
share or not to share information. The most impacted in the analysis is the perceived benefit
based on the perceived mission success. Bandura (1989) postulates that often people err in their
self-appraisals, and they tend to overestimate their capabilities. This is a benefit rather than a
cognitive failing that needs to be eradicated. If self-efficacy beliefs always reflected only what
people could do routinely, they would rarely fail; however, they would not mount the extra effort
needed to surpass their ordinary performance. IA overestimates their capabilities and the
benefits to the success of an operational mission. This benefit does not, and this process is so
built into an AI belief that, for many it becomes routine; therefore, their beliefs are that they
would rarely fail in an operational mission. Thus, many do not mount the extra effort needed to
ensure security and info sharing policies are not violated. Conversely, according to Bandura
(1989), evidence suggests that it is often the so-called normals who are distorters of reality.
However, they exhibit self-enhancing biases that distort appraisals in the positive direction
because they take an optimistic view of their personal efficacy to exercise influence over events
that affect their lives (Bandura, 1986, Taylor & Brown, 1988). The results support the fact that
subjects violated laws, violated their own principles, and violated the core of the military values.
Their subjective normal beliefs were, essentially, that they were simply doing what they were
supposed to do in order to uphold the values of their profession and their organization’s larger
purposes. Unfortunately, their actions would damage their careers, but in the long term, their
behavioral beliefs are those that led them to stand up for personal and institutional integrity.
Daily experience tells us that the deeper satisfactions we crave come from strong bonds of
mutual attachment to other people and larger causes outside ourselves. Heclo (2008) argues that,
with larger causes outside of oneself, the mirrors become windows and doors into a wider world
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of loyalties. He postulates that, in that world, a sense of well-being and happiness finds us rather
than our frantically chasing it down.
A surprising result is the weak relationship between the accuracy of data in info sharing
and the value of the information contributed. In the exploratory study, IA placed an enormous
amount of emphasis on the accuracy of the data shared, but very little attention to the value of
the information shared. Despite the best available evidence presented to decisions-makers, there
is always uncertainty inherent with the decisions made because it is impossible to have complete
and perfect information that answers all questions. With IA decisions and analysis of the risks
and benefits, uncertainty arises from the presence of conflicting influences: security and info
sharing policies as well as the personal (attitude and intuition) and normative beliefs. Thus,
making decisions in the presence of uncertainty is risky because wrong decisions could result in
failure of the operational mission, resulting in high costs, possibly lives. In these situations, the
IA has the added burden of knowing that, once these decisions are executed, they cannot be
reversed. The rational approach would be to evaluate the accuracy of the data and its value
(need) simultaneously for execution of the operational mission. However, during the period of
uncertainty with the influences that affect the decision, the IA behavior places greater emphasis
on experience and tacit knowledge, where accuracy of the data is vital to successful execution of
the mission. However, recent research analysis studies show that information in its various types
has a significant effect on increasing the power of an organization (Ahituv & Carmi, 2007). In
other words, the IC being richer in information than its adversaries is more powerful. This
defining of information as an influential factor is crucial to determining the power of the IC, thus
strengthening the importance and real value of information. It also provides a possible
explanation of the conflict in behavior of IA decisions. The argument is that IA are conflicted in

80
beliefs with their focus solely on the accuracy of data and not the value of information.
Moreover, it can provide an additional possible explanation to the influence of their decisions
(less value placed on the security and info sharing policies) in successful or unsuccessful
execution of operational missions.
In info sharing, an IA contribution when sharing often influences the value of the
information for others. In many cases, this higher value of the information for others is
associated with higher risks to the IC. Each contribution possibly results in greater value,
culminating in potentially greater risks. While accuracy was described as vital to successful
execution of a specific operational mission, the value of the information being shared was only
given second thoughts in comparison, resulting in violation of the security and info sharing
policies. In info sharing, the IA would not necessarily have complete knowledge on the risk
tolerance for a particular operational mission, thus relying heavily on accuracy for successful
execution without consideration of the value of the information. This is significant because
Messick and McClintock (1978) argued that human behavior is influenced by values that people
assign to different action alternatives and their consequences. Often, consequences of action
alternatives will not only affect the actors themselves but also other people; hence, the earlier
reference of the strong relationship between two IA.
Table 3 shows the number of respondents mentioning components (reasons/motives) for
sharing information. Another very interesting empirical finding of this research study is the lack
of adherence to security and info sharing policies as it relates to the perceived usefulness of the
policies in allowing successful execution of operational missions. The “execution of a successful
mission” and “mission first, fix policy later to adjust to meet mission needs” reasons stood out
significantly as large contributors (16 out of 18 on each) to the lack of adherence to security and
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info sharing policies. IA work in environments where sharing of information must be protected
at all levels to prevent loss of operational capabilities and to keep a competitive advantage over
adversaries in mission execution. It also allows IA the ability to make better decisions when
pieces of information are shared collectivity across the IC. The results found that most IA
viewed the policies as constraining or inhibiting towards accomplishing the missions and in most
of the scenarios actually violated the security and info sharing policies. In addition, when IA
beliefs were strong influences, it affected their decision to share information forcing possible
non-compliance with the oath of office or enlistment to include UCMJ authorities. This research
study empirically found that the lack of adherence to the security and info sharing is contrary to
what is understood in the IC and could shed light on this veil used by the IC that most IA
described as inhibitors or roadblocks in their analysis when considering the risks and benefits to
info sharing in deciding to share or not share information. As mentioned, the info sharing goals
as explained in ICD 501 are to: 1) foster an enduring culture of responsible sharing and
collaboration with an integrated IC; 2) provide an improved capacity to warn of and disrupt
threats to the U.S. homeland, and U.S. persons and interests; and 3) provide more accurate,
timely, and insightful analysis to inform decision-making by the president, senior military
commanders, national security advisers, and other executive branch officials were the focus of
most IA when deciding to share info, but contradicted other factors, specifically security policies,
when focusing on successfully executing the operational mission.
Info sharing has become critical due to the U.S. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act creating an Info-Sharing Environment fused by the ICD to foster a culture of
more sharing within inter-/intra-agency organization environments with pressures from
organization factors, such as, security and info sharing policies. Controlling of info sharing by
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solely focusing on the security and info sharing policies without the increasing demand for the
need of info sharing coupled with ever-changing Intel operational mission environments forces
IA to share info where the risks may outweigh the benefits. Due to these risks, amendments to
existing policies should be evaluated continuously. IA in their decisions to share or not share
information are faced with rapidly changing operational environments of available information
being shared, coalition collaboration, and changes in the classes of information shared, all of
which are evaluated by them in risk and benefit analysis influenced by their behavior. General
or static policies are inhibitors and require continuous monitoring with additions and deletions to
the rules to meet the changes in the environment that IA are faced with every day in the
operational environments. In the IC today, it takes months to change a security policy with
months of delays between the changes to be effective to the IA. What is needed is a capability
that enables dynamic switching between policies within minutes, without introducing new risks
or vulnerabilities, through a system that provides dynamic authoring, selection, and deployment
of security and info sharing-related policies and also allows IA to fully execute the operational
mission without risks and fully engage in the IC objective of inter-/intra-agency info sharing.
When security and info sharing policies are perceived as useful to IA, they will be applied
effectively in a risks-versus-benefits analysis and will influence their decision-making positively
in executing Intel operational missions.

CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
7.1 Contributions
This research makes five valuable contributions; to wit, it: 1) describes the paradox of
the info sharing decision of an IA analysis of the benefits and risks influenced by the
organization’s security and info sharing policies and an individual’s behavior intention; 2)
explains the decision-making behavior of people’s willingness to share information with others,
even when the risks may outweigh the benefits (to better understand how we might go about
modifying behavior in a desirable direction); 3) demonstrates how TPB may be used as an
analytical framework that describes how past behavior of users’ decisions to share information
with others in the IC; 4) develops a conceptual framework to evaluate adherence to info sharing
decision-making in the IC; and 5) provides practical guidance for improving IA decision-making
in the presence of the paradox.
First, the findings of this research study empirically demonstrate the paradox of the info
sharing decision of an IA analysis of the benefits and risks influenced by the organization’s
security and info sharing policies and an individual’s behavior intention. In describing the
paradox of the info sharing decision of IA analysis of the benefits and risks influenced by the
organization’s security and info sharing policies and an individual’s behavior intention, it begins
with understanding the behavior intention of IA. The decisions made within the paradox of info
sharing are not necessarily made in a rational fashion. A large body of empirical research attests
to the predictive validity of the TPB. Various techniques have been developed to increase
behavioral control, although these techniques have not been used in a TPB context. Some
methods focus on imbuing individuals with a sense of self-efficacy or perception of behavioral
control. These methods can thus influence behavioral intentions; that is, the motivation to
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engage in the behavior, but they may also provide valuable information about actual behavioral
performance.
The behavior intentions of IA begin with the extent to which they possess an accurate
understanding of their own mental processes as well as their understanding of the security and
info sharing policies. The behavior intention is based on how good their insight into how they
actually weigh evidence is in making judgments for each situation to be analyzed. In each
situation, they have a mental model consisting of beliefs and assumptions as to which variables
are most important and how the variables are related to each other. This research empirically
found how the paradox in navigating the benefits and risks in info sharing is strongly influenced
by IA beliefs, specifically their attitudes and intention, most important, their background beliefs,
like the religious belief. This supports TPB, specifically the extended research on background
factors conducted by Ouellette and Wood (1998). They postulated that, “in domains that
facilitated development and execution of habits, past behavior was a strong predictor and
intention relatively weak. In domains that did not facilitate habits, past behavior was a relatively
weak direct predictor and intention was quite strong” (Ouellette and Wood, 1998, p. 66).
Since IA actions are typically triggered by environmental events, activities are not
necessarily repetitive in nature and require great attention to detail. This research found that for
subjects with more experience and more analytical skill, in most cases, past behavior was
relatively weak and direct predictor and intention was strong; however, for the subjects that were
less skilled, past behavior was a strong predictor and intention relatively weak. This research
points out an exception in the research findings described by Ouellette and Wood (1998),
although it validates the extended portion of TPB. This research found that, in either situation,
certain factors can play a strong predicator whether habitual behavior or not, even where
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intention may be quite strong. In this research study, the past behavior was a strong predictor
and intention was strong despite the IA experience or skill level where the background factor
was significantly influenced by a personal belief, such as a religious belief or the value the IA
may place on the life of another.
Second, this research also explains the decision-making behavior of people’s willingness
to share information with others, even when the risks may outweigh the benefits. The empirical
findings demonstrated subjects are willing to risk sharing information with others, even when the
risks may outweigh the benefits, when the IA perceives that the sharing results in successful
execution of an operational mission. To this end, subjects accepted the risks or misinterpreted
the security and info sharing policies when they believed it was not to their advantage in
accomplishing the perceived organization’s primary goal, successful execution the operational
mission. To affect the decision influenced by security and info sharing policies as well as
behavior factors, such as attitude, intuition, and personal beliefs there must be behavior change
interventions.

Behavior change interventions must accomplish two major objectives: They

must motivate individuals to perform the behavior, and once this has been accomplished, they
must ensure that the behavior will be carried out.
There are two approaches to the behavioral change intervention. One approach involves
intervention based on TPB, which focuses on targeting behavioral, normative, and control beliefs
in an effort to produce positive intentions among the IA, who, prior to the intervention, either did
not contemplate performing the behavior or were disinclined to do so. In other cases, inducing
favorable intentions may not be enough to produce a change in the target behavior. First, the
implementation stage for changing the behavioral change of IA is to focus on control issues,
dealing with internal and external factors that can facilitate or inhibit performance of the
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intended behavior. The empirical research study demonstrated focus should be on the
information security and info sharing policies, which subjects felt inhibited their ability to
accomplish the mission. IA cannot be exposed to all possible scenarios of operational mission
events. This research study proves that introducing theoretic scenario-based operational mission
events that are designed to challenge unfavorable beliefs (religious or personal) resulting in the
consequences of violating the security and info sharing policies is a much greater risk to the IC
than actual successful execution or even perceived accomplishment of the ongoing mission. IA
believe that every piece of information that is shared contributes to successful execution of an
operational mission. What happens when the mission is not successful? Unfortunately, the
focus and control of the belief are weighted heavily on the perceived successful execution and
not those that would result in an unsuccessful execution. The change in focus would move
towards the needed behavioral change. IA should be exposed to scenario-based operational
mission events with emphasis on perceived unsuccessful executions to force a behavioral
change. This behavioral change would heighten the senses of IA focus on the benefits of using
the security and info sharing policies as successful applications versus inhibitors to operational
missions. Another approach is to use role models (senior officials) identified in stories of
scenario-based operational mission events designed to influence behavioral, normative, and
control beliefs. The interventions that balance the successful and unsuccessful will be quite
effective, producing changes in beliefs that will be reflected in the intended and actual decisions
of IA when sharing information. There should be less focus on the fact that shared information
absolutely results in successful execution of an operational mission and more focus on the the
fact that shared information only contributes to possible successful execution of an operational
mission. A change in the behavior requires a change in the inherent belief of many IA that
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shared information leads to successful execution of an operational mission; unsuccessful
execution in operational missions is not part of the attitude of IA.
The third contribution of this research study is the adaptation of TPB as an analytical
framework that describes how past behavior of users influences decisions to share information
with others in the IC. Some researchers (McClintock, 1978; Messick & McClintock, 1968)
posited that human behavior is influenced by values that people assign to different action
alternatives and their consequences. What is the behavior that influences an IA to share classified
material with others not authorized? In this research study, the behavior that influences an IA to
share classified material with others not authorized was mostly influence by the organization’s
desired goal of absolute perceived execution of operational mission success. Could IA behavior
have been influenced by values unconsciously inherited from being a member of the IC,
practicing the mandated security and info sharing policies? In the research study, IA values were
unconsciously inherited from the relationship of others within the IC, which felt inhibited by the
security and info sharing policies when driving towards the unit’s overall goal. In some
instances, another IA as social peer, impacted the IA decisions and actions resulting in perceived
success influenced the info sharing decision. In TPB, the most detailed substantive information
about the determinants of a behavior is contained in a person’s behavioral, normative, and
control beliefs. What are the most influential behavioral factors in the decision-making of IA
when sharing information with others? In this research study, the most influential behavioral
factors were attitude, intuition and personal beliefs that changed IA behavioral intention. This
supports TPB, which posits there are differences in the decision-making when an IA believes the
recipient has authorization versus no authorization. (Allport, 1935, 1968) pointed out that the
concept of attitude “is probably the most distinctive and indispensable concept in contemporary
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American social psychology” (1968, p. 59). With this understanding, often, consequences of
action alternatives will not only affect the actors themselves but also others; most important, the
IC. In the adaptation of TPB, these values include an actor’s background factors (social,
personal, information) and beliefs (behavior, normal, control).
The background and beliefs of an individual represent a behavior intention, as well as a
stable preference for distribution outcomes (inadvertent, desired, or intentional) between one’s
own self and the organization. The background factors (See Appendix A) and individual beliefs
are extremely important influencing factors in the conflict between the behavior of IA and the
organization’s security and info sharing policies in the paradox of info sharing. Do IA consider
their own benefits and risks in sharing information but also the benefits and risks to the
organization? Will they contribute more information of high value than information of low
value? The logical answer is, the IA may very well, in their decision to share information,
consider the benefits and risks to others. This could result in contributing more information of
value or higher classification that benefits an IA during a successful mission, but violates the
organization’s security and info sharing polices to do so. On the other hand, it may be consistent
with the organization’s security and info sharing policies, resulting in sharing information of less
value or lower classification, but also in an unsuccessful mission.
In some cases, inducing favorable intentions may not be enough to produce a change in
the target behavior. In these instances, two interventions may be required; one to produce the
desired intention and another very different intervention to facilitate performance of the intended
behavior. When asked to explain why they failed to act on their intentions, people often say that
they forgot or it slipped their minds (Orbell, Hodgkinson, & Sheeran 1997; Sheeran & Orbell
1999). To close the gap, the focus must be on implementation intention. The approach is to ask
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IA when, where, and how they will carry out their intentions, important for less and highly
skilled analysts, increasing the likelihood that they will so. The focus should be on situations
that violate security and info sharing policies and that inhibit operational missions. These will
allow control of the behaviors and facilitate in practicing in environments where success is
measured differently and total focus is not only on successful execution of the mission, but also
on successful execution of compliance with security and info sharing policies.
Lack of adequate control over the behavior can make it difficult or impossible to perform
an intended behavior. Internal factors, such as lack of sufficient willpower and perseverance or
lack of requisite skills and resources or external factors, like cooperation from another person,
can interfere with planned behavior. Additional methods can be developed to increase
behavioral control that focus on instilling individuals with a sense of self-efficacy or perception
of behavioral control. The methods would influence behavioral intention, which is the
motivation to engage in the behavior, while also providing valuable information about actual
behavioral performance. Observational learning, modeling techniques and mental simulation, all
of which are the premises of the theoretic scenario-based operational missions in this research
study, provide valuable information about actual behavioral performance. Successive
approximation and simulation of the desired behavior are other methods that are designed to
provide individuals with the tools and other resources needed to overcome potential hurdles and
gain actual control over behavior performance.
The fourth contribution of this research study is the development of a conceptual
framework to evaluate adherence to info sharing decision-making in the IC. Within the
conceptual framework of this research study, the IA’s benefits and risks analysis are moderated
by organizational factors (security and info sharing policies) and behavioral intentions (attitude,
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values, and intuition), which influence info sharing decisions that result in desirable or
undesirable outcomes. As empirically found in this research study, past behavior influenced IA
decisions during info sharing. This past behavior influencing factor was also empirically proven
in Kidwell and Jewell’s (2008) research study were the influencing factors where considered a
critical part of the decision making process. Therefore, this research study further suggests that
the past behavior, such as, intuitions and personal beliefs, are influencing factors on the
intentions of the decision maker.
Gibbsons et al. (2003) developed the Prototype-Willingness Model (PWM) based on
three assumptions about risky behaviors among adolescents and young adults. Gibbsons et al.
(2003) posited risky behavior is neither reasoned nor intentional, which led to additional
constructs of TPB with the predictors of behavioral expectations and behavioral willingness.
IA access to information processing is approved based on security clearance level, need
to know, and system access to the appropriate classification levels of the information. Generally,
an IA has access to data at three classification levels: Unclassified, Secret, and Top Secret.
Although there are other compartmented classifications within each of the general levels of
access, the focus of this research study is on the access to information at these three general
levels. It is important to understand how an IA attempts to process information since it is part of
his/her internal process to decision-making. According to Neisser (1967), most people operate in
a perception-action cycle, suggesting that the senses take in information from the environment,
the mid brain performs computations on that information and the outputs of those computations
are used to guide subsequent goad-directed actions. However, Newell and Broder (2008) argue
that, since most people’s information capacity is limited, he/she must use cognitive models to
propose heuristics or shortcuts.
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The organization’s security and info sharing policies have increased in complexity when
sharing across an intra-/inter-agency. First, it changes rapidly with the increasing need for intra/inter-agency sharing of information. There are partnerships that form and disband based on an
organization’s interest and mission execution. At any moment, a partnership must be formed
under the conditions that info sharing is necessary based on a new agreement between the U.S.
and a national partner because of the relationship in a particular environment that is later
disbanded under the conditions that the partner now puts the organization at risk. The
organization’s need for sharing information often changes and is often unclear at different levels
within the organization or across inter-/intra-agencies. At various levels, organizations have
strict policies to sharing information, but they are created generically at very high levels and
execution is done at much lower levels and could very well be left to different interpretations by
individuals that could put the organization at risk. These types of conditions intensify when
considering how IA seek information to share.
Given the need for the increase in info sharing across intra-/inter-agency organizations
and the importance of the benefits and risks associated with sharing information, understanding
the how and why provides insights into behaviors of IA decision-making. Moreover, previous
studies reveal that computer supported info sharing plays an increasing role in a multitude of
situations, such as organizational knowledge management, online collaboration, and decisionmaking. Since info sharing does not always flow as smoothly as expected and the decision to
share is impacted by various factors, it is important for inter-/intra-agency organizations to
understand the behavior of IA. Specifically, attitude and intuition, which influence the
willingness or non-willingness of the IA decision to share information released inadvertently or
intentionally that may violate security and info sharing policies and put the IC at greater risk;
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and, thereby, possibly put the nation at risk. Developing more effective decision-making,
however, requires organizations to fully understand not only how these intended decisions and
past behaviors are developed in theory, but also how they are developed in practice. This study
provides further insights into this process and the interactions that influence the decision while
exploring the behavior of IA. This study also illuminates the mechanisms by which information
behavior was propagated. These mechanisms include the use of mediators (attitude and intuition)
which was perceived as one part of the paradox in the decision-making for IAs and was,
therefore, propagated and legitimated in narratives. Hence, because intuition was perceived as
an influenced mediator, it was perpetuated as a social norm in the perceived behavioral control of
the TPB model. This occurred despite the conflict with the security and info sharing policies, the
other part of the paradox, in the conceptual model.
By a close examination of the info sharing decision-making of IA using the theoretic
operational mission based scenarios, this research provided revelations of the behaviors and
behavior intentions through which IA info sharing decisions flow. Although one cannot
generalize from these only, by exploring the analysis within each scenario and comparing across
each of them, this provides approaches to understanding info sharing decision-making within
organizations and the conflicts that exist. Background factors (past behavior) in general are
understood as actions or reactions of a person in response to external or internal stimuli in the
past. These factors include general attitudes, personality traits, values, emotions, intelligence,
age, gender, race, ethnicity, education, religion, experience, knowledge, and media exposure. As
such, specific interest in this research is in the relationship between past behavior and intention
under special circumstances of IA experience or habits. Moreover, understanding behavioral
intentions using past behaviors that lead to decision-making, specifically the role of past
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behavior as predictor of intention, recently has had a considerable amount of attention in the
literature, but is also criticized based on the relevance of past behavior being an extra predictor.
Therefore, this study offers a further contribution in showing the value of applying past behavior
and developing TPB as a framework for studying developing info sharing decision-making in
inter-/intra-agency organizations.
Finally, the fifth contribution of this research study is to provide practical guidance for
improving IA decision-making in the presence of the paradox. Most security policies address
some form of vulnerability management. IT security professionals depend upon accurate
assessments to determine whether intervention is necessary and implement proper steps for
mitigation or remediation. There is no problem obtaining the data. Most security devices and
scanners generate terabytes of data for analysis. The challenge is interpreting the data,
specifically, identifying those specific vulnerabilities that truly represent a clear and present risk
to intelligence information. IA need solutions that help them distinguish the danger signals from
the noise that allows them to follow through with actions. For example, a mission-critical Web
Server may have several known vulnerabilities, but which of those present a genuine risk and
require analysis of the benefits and risks. For an IA Senior to be successful, vulnerability
management solutions should identify and dismiss certain attacks as “noise” and flag the others
as “signals” that require immediate attention that allows the IA to share information without
background factor influences weighing heavily on their decisions
Compliance is another challenge with the perception that attaining compliance reduces
risk to acceptable levels. For example, the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards,
(PCI-DSS), Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards,
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Federal Information Security Mandate Act (FISMA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) standards all drive organizations to adopt security risk management
approaches, but compliance guidelines and standards alone doesn’t necessarily equate to
successful info sharing. To achieve effective risk management in sharing information, IA must
abandon the limitations and expenses of traditional, reactive approaches in favor of objective
learning combined with the understanding of proactive security, data-driven investment models.
In addition, they must overcome several challenges: analysis and interpreting massive amounts
of data, monitoring dynamic assets, incorporating both compliance and security into best
practices, moving beyond the traditional rational decision-making as well as the utilizing the
standard “scan-and-patch” approaches to implement security best practice programs, and trusting
conventional prioritization methods beyond their scope. Unfortunately, IA rely on rational
decisions and the IC enterprise trust that “scan-and-patch” methods for security. However,
training IA in methods based on rational choice coupled with security patching that inherently
keeps cybercriminals or hackers ahead inhibits info sharing and greater allows for influence of
background factors to affect the decision in info sharing. The focus cannot be solely on security
patching, although an important step, IA need a variety of proactive solutions, like the objective
learning, theoretical models and simulations combined with implementation of the security and
info sharing practices in the IC.

7.2 Limitations
With any research, there are always anticipated limitations that may offer opportunities
for future studies. First, since this research involves only three scenarios, there is a problem with
the generalizability of the research from sample to population. Second, this study is limited to
one intra-agency organization, the IC, including the military services, that varies greatly in their
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operational missions, is decentralized in their decision-making, and is engaged in protecting the
national defense of the United States. As such, changes in the findings may occur in studies
involving public organizations or differ from these inter-/intra-agencies in size, location, degree
of decentralization, mission, environment, and organizational structure. Third, interviews based
upon past events may be biased, events may be filtered out that do not fit, or certain views could
be censored, even though the researcher will make an effort to mitigate any biases through
triangulation and verification using multiple data sources. Finally, past behavior must be
examined to determine if further functions may be relevant and other factors may exist, the
inclusion of which could improve explained variance of intention, which should be analyzed
over time.
7.2.1 Generalizability. Firestone (1993) suggests three levels of generalization: sample
to population; analytic, which is theory connected; and case-to-case research. With only three
cases, this research will not be generalizable from sample to population, but will have analytic
and case-to-case generalizability. The choice of the scenarios in this particular research study is
based upon conceptual grounds not on representative ground. The research used multiple-case
sampling and cross-case comparison in following replication strategy to identify repeating
patterns (Miles & Huberman, 1994b; Yin, 2009). This cross-case comparison is made possible
in that the selected scenarios are in similar settings, involve a coherent sampling frame, and
focus on similar processes. According to Mason (2002), the limited sample to population
generalizability of case study research should be balanced against advantages of its attention to
context dynamics, and multiple participants perspective. In addition, Lincoln and Guba (1985)
suggest audit procedures that will help other researchers to assess the findings in their
transferability to other contexts. To ensure rigor, the study triangulated between different data

96
sources, checking against public data and internal communications, multiple interviewees,
feedback from key participants, and field observations (Miles & Huberman, 1994b; Yin, 2009, p.
267).
7.2.2 Variance. An additional limitation in this research study is that a majority of the
subjects actually shared information during their analysis of the theoretic operational based
scenarios, resulting in actual violation of security and info sharing policies or in non-compliance
with their oath of office or enlistment, potentially being in violation of the UCMJ. This is an
issue with the research results producing insufficient variance in results to enable one to
distinguish between the reasons for adherence to the security and info sharing policies when
compared to reasons not to adhere to the security and info sharing policies. It would be
interesting for future research to investigate the functionality of the security and info sharing
policies in a way that better captures explanations that focus specifically in the area of adhering
to the security and info sharing policies.

CONCLUSION
The aim of this exploratory study was to examine the behavior of IA and to investigate
the paradox of info sharing in the IC. Why do people share information with others; primarily
what influences the individual’s decision that drives him/her to violate security and info sharing
policies? The understanding of IA behaviors allows a better understanding of how one might go
about modifying behavior in a desirable direction. The results provide support that background
factors do influence the beliefs people hold. These factors (attitudes and intuition) and broad life
values influence intentions, and, thus, an IA decision in info sharing. Hodgkinson, Salder-Smith,
Burke, Claston, and Sparrow (2009a, p. 277) noted that until recently, only the “bravest and most
far-sighted” would recognized the utility of intuition in management decision-making.
Why did IA actually violate security and info sharing policies so easily? There is a major
external influence on IA in accomplishing the organization’s goal of mission success. IA
construct their own version of reality based on information provided by the senses. IA beliefs in
their capabilities affect how much stress and depression they experience in threatening or taxing
situations, as well as their level of motivation. Such emotional reactions can influence behaviors
both directly and indirectly by altering their decision to share information and the course of
actions they choose. IA who believe they can exercise control (perceived behavioral control)
over beliefs do not conjure up apprehensive cognitions; in other words, they saw no conflict in
their decisions when balancing them against the administrative security and info sharing policies;
therefore, they are not perturbed by them. However, anxiety arose when their beliefs conflicted
with organizational goals or personal values (attitudes and intuition) and they often

97

98
overestimated their decision when balanced against the core values of the military and the
security and info sharing policies.
Part of ensuring the overall reliability of adherence to security and info sharing policies
requires changes in the operation of how we develop and revise new policies, as well as,
reviewing the processes on how these policies are understood and implemented. To implement
the appropriate mechanisms for enforcing those policies, requires policy bundles that will
contain a variety of components conducive to ever-changing environments in the execution of
Intel operational mission. In addition, the policies must be adaptive to security enforcement of
rapid deployment and within minutes without introducing new risk or vulnerabilities through a
system that allows for dynamic authoring, selection, and deployment of security and info sharing
related policies. Another approach to ensure adherence to the security and info sharing policies
is to implement case-based training to facilitate IA understanding of importance of the policies
that aid in their accomplishing Intel operational mission. In addition, behavior change
intervention may be required. To do this, it must accomplish two objectives: motivate the IA to
perform a different behavior, and, once this has been accomplished, it must ensure that the
behavior be carried out. Focusing on the control issues, dealing with internal and external
factors that can facilitate or inhibit performance of the intended behavior—in other words,
mission first and always—are factors that will always drive an IA to think the mission is above
the law. Intervention studies have shown that changing people’s behavioral, normative, and
control beliefs influences their intentions and actions.

APPENDICES
Appendix A: Theory of Planned Behavior and Information Sharing
Paradox Constructs

Background
Factors

Past behavior beliefs that are actions or reactions of a person in
response to external or internal stimuli in the past; relational
properties are general attitudes, personality traits, values,
emotions, intelligence, age, gender, race, ethnicity, education,
religion, experience, knowledge, and media exposure; specific
interest in this research study is relationship between past behavior
and intention under special circumstances of Intelligence
Operators experience/habits (risky behavior)

Behavior
Beliefs

Beliefs about the likely outcomes of the behavior and the
evaluation of these outcomes; produces a favorable or unfavorable
attitude toward the behavior

Normal
Beliefs

Beliefs about the normative expectations and actions of important
referents and motivation to comply with these referents; results in
perceived social pressure or a subjective norm

Control
Beliefs

Beliefs about the presence of factors that may facilitate or impede
performance of the behavior and the perceived power of these
factors; gives rise to perceived behavioral control

Behavior
Intentions

Intelligence
Analyst
Access
Risks To
Be Taken

With the combination of attitude toward the behavior (behavior
beliefs), subjective norm (normal beliefs), and perception of
behavioral control (control beliefs) leads to the formation of a
behavioral intention
Independent variable and the unit of analysis identified as the who
or what and is described and analyzed in this research study;
relational proprieties are tacit knowledge, individual interests,
values, emotions, intuition, attitudes, media exposure, age, gender,
ethnicity, race, and religion
Dependent variable describing the level of risk to be taken under
consideration by the (independent variable) Intelligence Operator
moderated by the value of information and power behind
information as well as moderated by the policies and directives of
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the organization; organizational portfolio conditions (independent
variable) competes with the Intelligence Operator in determining
the amount of risk under consideration for sharing information

Information
Sharing Decision

Type of
Outcome

The results of the risk to be taken decision by the Intelligence
Operator is mediated by cost-benefit analysis and Intelligence
Operators behavior biases; behavior biases are moderated by
behavioral intentions
Dependent variable that reflects positive or negative information
sharing decisions made by Intelligence Operators moderated by
the cost-benefit analysis of Intelligence Operators and their
behavior biases
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Appendix B: Interview Guide

DESCRIPTION

1. What was your first instinct behind the analysis of your decisions?
2. How would you characterize your decision?
a) Positively
b) Negatively
3. How do you believe the organization would characterize your decision?
a) Positively
b) Negatively
4. Do you believe your decision in this scenario aligns with the organization’s security
and information sharing policy?
5. Does it make a difference what people you are interacting with when deciding to
share information?
6. Which is more important to you? (Please explain your response.)
a) Ensuring accurate data is shared for mission accomplishment?
b) Understanding the value of the information being shared?
7. If you identify negative actions (incidents) in sharing information that result in a
desired outcome for the organization or Intelligence Community accomplishing the
mission
a) What actions do you take?
b) How do you react?
8. If you identify positive actions in sharing information that results in an undesirable
outcome for the organization or Intelligence Community
a) What actions do you take?
b) How do you react?
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